

The Power of Outreach

Leveraging Expertise on Threats in Southeast Asia

A Report of the CSIS Transnational Threats Project

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

CIP information available on request.

ISBN 978-0-89206-577-6

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PREFACE

Transnational Threats in an Uncertain World

The Atlantic Ocean is the second largest of the world's oceanic divisions—41.1 million square miles—and covers one-fifth of the Earth's surface at an average depth of 10,936 ft. Yet two nuclear submarines, one French (*Le Triomphant*), the other British (HMS *Vanguard*), each carrying 16 nuclear missiles, failed to detect each other's presence and collided deep in the Atlantic. There was enough damage to send them both back to their home ports. The incident was appropriately symbolic of the multiple geopolitical collisions involving major powers due to poor seamanship.

Renowned international investor George Soros says the world financial system has effectively disintegrated. He describes the economic turbulence as being more severe than it was during the Great Depression, comparing the current situation to the demise of the Soviet Union. And there is still no prospect of a near-term resolution of the crisis. The American “body economic” is on life support for the indefinite future.

Admiral Dennis C. Blair, the national intelligence director, testifying before Congress, called the global economic and financial crisis “our greatest threat.”¹ It has created millions more desperate people and fostered “regime-threatening instability”—the kind of chaos that plays into al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden's terrorist agenda. Bin Laden long ago convinced himself it was the “Arab Afghans” he recruited for the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan that collapsed the Soviet empire. The last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan on February 15, 1989; nine months later the Berlin Wall collapsed. Bin Laden now believes the American empire is similarly moribund.

In parsing bin Laden's many videos, Internet statements, and letters, it is clear that al Qaeda's ultimate goal is the economic collapse of the United States. His targets are U.S. financial centers and economic infrastructure. His weapon of choice: terrorism. Today, he sees the United States teetering on the brink of economic collapse, and in spite of losing key al Qaeda lieutenants in

¹ Dennis C. Blair, “Annual Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” February 12, 2009, http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20090212_testimony.pdf, 3.

Pakistan and Afghanistan, he believes the U.S. empire requires one last big terrorist push to ensure its defeat.

According to the U.S. intelligence community, al Qaeda's recent actions might have harmed this ambitious agenda. As Admiral Blair reported to Congress,²

we have seen notable progress in Muslim opinion turning against terrorist groups like al-Qa'ida. Over the last year and a half, al-Qa'ida has faced significant public criticism from prominent religious leaders and fellow extremists primarily regarding the use of brutal and indiscriminate tactics—particularly those employed by al Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) and al-Qa'ida in the Lands of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)—that have resulted in the deaths of Muslim civilians. Given the increased pressure posed by these criticisms, al-Qa'ida leaders increasingly have highlighted enduring support for the Taliban and the fight in Afghanistan and Pakistan and in other regions where they portray the West being at war with Islam and al-Qa'ida as the vanguard of the global terrorist movement.

With unemployment around the world headed for 100 million, policy planners and decisionmakers find themselves behind the curve of failing states—and transnational terrorism. This reality quickly displaces favorable trends in the war on terror, with particularly profound impact in Pakistan. For decades, a quarter of Pakistan's labor force found jobs in the oil-rich Gulf states that provided for workers' families from Quetta to Lahore and from Karachi to Peshawar. But now, boom city Dubai is at a construction standstill.

From Kuwait to Riyadh to Abu Dhabi, lower oil prices and the economic meltdown have driven thousands of Pakistanis out of well-paid jobs, adding to growing unemployment in Pakistan (now 35 percent). A weak government, the rapid growth of extremist politics spearheaded by the Taliban, and unemployment and demographic pressure all point to a lack of national unity in a nuclear power. The under-15 population is almost 40 percent of the total. After 10 years in madrasahs, single-discipline Qur'anic schools, some are eager for jihad. Others pursue further religious studies to become fundamentalist mullahs or imams and, thoroughly brainwashed to believe that the United States, Israel, and India are in a conspiracy to destroy Islam, become qualified to teach unadulterated disinformation.

The father of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal (estimated at 100 nuclear weapons) and its master clandestine nuclear proliferator for the benefit of the United States' enemies is Dr. A.Q. Khan, recently released from five years of house arrest. Dr. Khan is a close friend of retired General Hamid Gul, the former intelligence chief, who is a friend of Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, and admirer of al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden.

A failing nuclear Muslim state ruled by self-avowed enemies of the United States is now a real danger. President Asif Zardari's acceptance of a Shari'a law-run Swat valley is a major step on the

² Ibid., 4–5.

road to chaos. Some 3,000 Taliban insurgents fought 12,000 Pakistani soldiers to a standstill, and the Zardari government conceded. Pakistan's seven tribal areas along the Afghan border are already under the sway of Taliban and al Qaeda. Pakistan succumbing to a national government of politico-religious figures, as the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan did until defeated in the February 18, 2008, elections, is now a conceivable scenario. Pakistan would then be well on its way to becoming a second Iran—the former Sunni Islam and the latter Shi'a Islam.

In a CSIS report titled *FATA—A Most Dangerous Place* published in January 2009, the undersigned with Shuja Nawaz and a team of experts conclude that this area may well be the source of another 9/11 type of attack on the Western world or its surrogates in the region. Should such an attack occur, it likely will be spawned in the militancy that grips the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and contiguous areas in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In the first-ever interview by a director general of Britain's security service MI5, Jonathan Evans said the world could be in a "watershed moment" that will shift the balance of power away from the West. "There is no single path that leads people to violent extremism," said Mr. Evans; "social, foreign policy, economic and personal factors all lead people to throw their lot in with extremists."³ He had already warned that al Qaeda was recruiting British Muslims as young as 15 and that some 2,000 suspected extremists were under surveillance, cautioning, "we don't have anything approaching comprehensive coverage."⁴

In the Middle East, the emergence of a hard-line Israeli government doomed any chance of a compromise settlement of the Palestinian conflict. Illegal Jewish enclaves in the West Bank continue to expand and flourish, annexing Palestinian land and leaving Arab youngsters little alternative to joining the axis of upheaval.

The pages ahead in this CSIS Transnational Threats Project study on extremism in Southeast Asia—known as TIN-2 (Trusted Information Network-2)—are glimmers of hope on the transnational terrorism front. Long referred to as the "second front" in the "Global War on Terror," Southeast Asia has improved since 2002, when a powerful bomb ripped through a nightclub in Bali, Indonesia, killing more than 200 people. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), an Islamist group previously linked to al Qaeda, was responsible for the blast. Since that attack, however, the group has fallen on hard times. Public backlash over its violent tactics, the arrest of several of its key members, and infighting within its ranks have left its operational capacity severely degraded and its current desire to mount additional attacks in question. In addition, Australian and U.S. assistance to Indonesia's law enforcement and intelligence services provide powerful tools for keeping a potential JI resurgence in check.

³ Duncan Gardham, "MI5 Chief Warns of Threat from Global Recession," *Telegraph* (London), January 7, 2009, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newsttopics/politics/defence/4144460/MI5-chief-warns-of-threat-from-global-recession.html>.

⁴ Ibid.

The southern Philippines has witnessed similar progress. There, operations against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), a hybrid criminal-terrorist gang, have led to the “decimation of ASG ranks and capacity and dwindling popular support in its base on Basilan,” the group’s island redoubt.⁵ Meanwhile, in southern Thailand, a violent ethnonationalist insurgency has not spread beyond the provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat and certain districts within the Songkhla province. Despite offers of assistance from foreign extremists, this insurgency remains an entirely indigenous affair. In Thailand and Burma especially, but in other parts of Southeast Asia as well, criminal activity fuels and compounds instability and extremism, while corrupt government officials benefit from the mayhem.

What is clear from the variety of conflicts and ills in the region—and seen in great detail through the operation of TIN-2—is that nongovernmental specialists who work these issues on a daily basis provide the best local lens through which to understand and confront them. In organizing 13 of the top specialists on the criminal, political, ethnic, and religious dynamics of Southeast Asia, it became evident that governments must collaborate with a range of experts in order to decipher the interwoven complexities of conflict, extremism, and criminality in the region.

Although some parts of Southeast Asia are heading in the right direction, the continued failure to address long-standing grievances, the self-defeating tendency to view any violence associated with Muslims as al Qaeda–linked terrorism, combined with the unfolding and worsening global economic slowdown could easily reverse this trend. With the panoply of pressures facing the United States and its Southeast Asian partners at the moment, a renewed threat of extremism and violence in the region would be unwelcome indeed.

Think tank scholars are speculating that this could be the moment in history when U.S. global dominance begins to recede. In a new report by Chatham House, the leading British think tank, its director, Robin Niblett, and his contributors reassess the United States’ international role. They still see a need for U.S. leadership, but argue that Washington must first adapt to the new constraints on bilateral relations; understand its opponents better and support its allies more; focus more on governance and processes and less on leaders and parties; strengthen multilateral cooperation; lead by example; and produce a new style of U.S. leadership.⁶

Chatham House, which is shorthand for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, ends its report by arguing that “while the United States may not be able to drive international solutions to its own design as successfully in the future as it did in the past, it will remain, as Zbigniew Brzezinski has described it, the “linchpin” [sic] power in the international system for the

⁵ International Crisis Group, *The Philippines: Counter-Insurgency vs. Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao*, Asia Report no. 152, May 14, 2008, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5441&l=1>.

⁶ Robin Niblett, *Ready to Lead? Rethinking America’s Role in a Changed World* (London: Chatham House, 2009), 43–44, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/13443_r0209us_role.pdf.

foreseeable future.”⁷ The prerequisite for “lynchpin power,” we believe, rests on “understanding opponents better.” To meet this challenge, it is imperative for the U.S. government to engage nongovernmental experts, which is what this TIN-2 report set out to achieve.

—*Arnaud de Borchgrave*

⁷ *Ibid.*, 44.



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors gratefully acknowledge the Smith Richardson Foundation, the Kathryn W. Davis Foundation, and CENTRA Technology for their generous support of this project. Sincere thanks are also due to the Centre of Excellence for National Security in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, which organized the project's closing conference with the support of the National Security Coordination Secretariat in the Singapore Prime Minister's Office. Overall support for the Transnational Threats Project, and for this initiative, is provided by the Sarah Scaife Foundation, without whose contribution our work could not be accomplished. Additionally, we owe a debt of gratitude to the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney, Australia, for hosting and supporting the project's kickoff meeting in February 2008.

The TIN-2 members, listed at the end of this report, far exceeded our expectations on all fronts. Their expertise, enthusiasm, generosity, and patience made this project both successful and enjoyable.

This project would not have been possible without the generous and talented contributions of many individuals. Timothy Galpin, James Harris, Jeff Jonas, Richard O'Neill, Kumar Ramakrishna, Marc Sageman, Suzanne Spaulding, Aaron Frank, and Jonathan Winer formed the TIN's senior advisory group and provided critical guidance and feedback. Thanks are also due to Jeff Cooper, who provided valuable insights about collaborative networks early in the project, and to Jacqueline Harned, whose central participation in the first two phases of the TIN helped lay the foundation for continued success. David Kamien and his staff at Mind Alliance were extremely generous with their time and resources and delivered a custom-designed, creative, and successful collaborative platform.

This report benefited tremendously from the substantive contributions and careful review provided by Aaron Frank of BAE Systems. His invaluable assistance cannot be overstated. Our special thanks also go to the current and former members of the U.S. and foreign intelligence communities who provided their candid perspectives regarding government policy on the use of open source information and outreach to experts.

Debbie Stroman, executive assistant, and Abe Kanter, editor, were critical members of the Transnational Threats Project staff and TIN project. Finally, we wish to express our gratitude to Amy Frazier, Matthäus Trauttmansdorff, Daniel Bregman, Noah Schwartz, Matthew Clawson, Gautam Thapar, Emily Goldberg, and Gary Tripmacher for their valuable assistance to the project.



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The U.S. intelligence community (IC) has made great strides in collecting and analyzing open source information since this CSIS project began in 2004. These expanded capabilities did not emerge by accident. Instead, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), with the support of the U.S. Congress, made a commitment to strengthen the use of open source information with policy, strategies, dedicated leadership, human resources, financial support, and governance structures. As a result, “open source” is now more fully embraced across the IC.

By contrast, the IC’s outreach efforts lag behind. Nongovernmental experts are not integral to collection strategies, nor are they adequately leveraged by analysts. This shortcoming is a critical weakness in the United States’ intelligence apparatus. Nongovernmental specialists are often the top experts on many high-priority subjects. By not drawing on these “best sources,” the IC fails to reach its full potential.

In an effort to invigorate the debate on expanding IC outreach, the CSIS Transnational Threats Project created and operated a Trusted Information Network (TIN) to examine extremism and transnational crime in Southeast Asia. Comprised of top specialists from the region and beyond, this network highlighted the immense expertise such a group could bring to bear on important national security priorities by answering a series of relevant questions. Simultaneously, this effort demonstrated ways in which the IC could draw on TINs to collect and analyze information in the future. Based on our experience, we believe that TINs could strengthen open source *collection* by:

- capturing unique data through multiple, local lenses;
- vetting data using subject matter experts;
- rapidly aggregating high-quality, open source data; and
- reading and communicating in local languages and dialects without heavy dependence on translators or translation software.

We also believe that TINs could act as a sounding board and critic during the *analysis and production* phase to:

- evaluate sources;

- challenge analytic assumptions;
- formulate new hypotheses;
- evaluate existing analytic hypotheses or conclusions; and
- generate alternative conclusions.

Getting the IC to implement a robust outreach capability is not a matter of flipping a switch. Several deeply entrenched obstacles prevent meaningful collaboration for both the intelligence and nongovernmental communities. For the IC, these barriers include legal, procedural, and professional issues; cultural biases; counterintelligence and deception concerns; and the inability to communicate topics of interest to academic and foreign audiences. Nongovernmental experts often avoid collaboration with the IC due to concerns that doing so might jeopardize their personal safety; long-standing professional norms that discourage involvement with intelligence activities; a lack of government transparency on how their information will be used; and a one-way flow of information wherein they provide insights and seldom receive any unclassified data in return.

Overcoming these obstacles is a formidable but necessary undertaking. Having polled TIN members on their willingness to be engaged by government analysts, most—but not all—stated that they would be willing to do so, provided certain conditions were met. Breaking down the barriers that prevent collaboration on the government side is more difficult.

In order to begin tearing down these obstacles to outreach, the IC must take earnest and significant steps. We recommend that the IC consider the absence of robust outreach as a collection gap; identify the relative absence of outreach as an analytic weakness; strengthen and fully support outreach from the top; build support for outreach at the working level; promote outreach with incoming analysts; be knowledgeable of the top nongovernmental experts; and ensure that efforts to improve outreach are balanced with measures that mitigate the associated counterintelligence risks. We also recommend that the U.S. Congress play a strong role through legislation and oversight that demands, funds, and reviews changes in the IC's outreach efforts.

By adopting the same systematic and programmatic approach to outreach as it applied to open source, the IC can leverage incredible human resources that remain largely ignored. This will require a great deal of effort, but the dividends would be tremendous, while failing to do so will leave the United States and its friends and allies less secure.

1

PROJECT BACKGROUND

This CSIS Transnational Threats Project (TNT) report represents the third phase in a multiyear study designed to improve understanding of transnational terrorism through enhanced access to open source information and nongovernmental expertise. In March 2006, TNT published the study's first report, *Open Source Information: The Missing Dimension of Intelligence*.¹ This publication described the continued underutilization of open sources across government intelligence agencies and highlighted the value of such information for analyzing Salafi jihadism and other national security threats in Europe and beyond. The report ended by offering a unique approach to accessing open source information on transnational threats through the establishment of small teams of nongovernmental experts in an online Trusted Information Network (TIN).

In 2006 to 2007, TNT put this theory into practice by successfully establishing and operating a year-long TIN focused on Europe. Comprised of 12 men and women from eight countries and four continents, the TIN discussed a series of questions designed to draw out new knowledge on several facets of Islamist radicalization and violence in Europe. Simultaneously, the TIN served as a proof of concept, illustrating one approach to managing diverse, nongovernmental expertise across time zones and cultures. The substantive findings generated by the TIN were published in July 2007 under the title *Force Multiplier for Intelligence: Collaborative Open Source Networks*.² This report also included insights on the tools, techniques, and challenges involved in operating this form of “collective intelligence.”

In order to build on this initiative, CSIS convened a second TIN (TIN-2) in early 2008 to look at extremism and its connections to transnational crime in Southeast Asia and Australia. TIN-2 was an online network of 14 highly respected, nongovernmental experts from a range of disciplines with deep and varied perspectives on these topics. Scholars and specialists from, and

¹ Arnaud de Borchgrave, Thomas Sanderson, and John MacGaffin, *Open Source Information: The Missing Dimension of Intelligence* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2006),

http://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=2931.

² Arnaud de Borchgrave, Thomas Sanderson, and Jacqueline Harned, *Force Multiplier for Intelligence: Collaborative Open Source Networks* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2007),

http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,3980/type,0/.

who had done extensive field work in, Thailand, Singapore, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Australia, Israel, Myanmar (Burma), and the United States were included in this group. The goal of TIN-2 was to expand on the lessons learned from the first TIN and to provide clarity on the value that collective intelligence networks can offer government analysts confronting complex, transnational threats.

In March 2008, CSIS led a workshop on the lessons learned from outreach to experts. Building on the findings from the TIN project and those of others, this workshop produced a report titled *International Collaborative Online Networks: Lessons Identified from the Public, Private, and Nonprofit Sectors*.³

Since the TIN project began in 2004, CSIS's Transnational Threats Project has sought to demonstrate how nongovernmental specialists, using exclusively open source information, could contribute to the collection and analysis of intelligence. The project was also intended to identify tools and techniques that analysts could use to gather and leverage outside perspectives. The TIN project differentiates itself from governments' larger efforts at the electronic exploitation of open source information with this dynamic network of specialists. It is our belief that the TIN model can play a unique, valuable, and urgently needed role in addressing top-tier security concerns.

Concerning TIN Membership and Methodology

No government intelligence analysts were included on either of the two TIN teams, and no U.S. government funding was sought (nor was it offered) for either TIN project. TNT staff felt that doing so in the first versions of the TIN could preclude participation by some experts and lead to negative or misperceptions over sponsorship. Following consultation with both TIN teams, it became clear that the participation of government analysts in future TINs would be feasible and welcome, provided certain conditions were met. In the TIN-2 Analysis section of this report, we will discuss some of the obstacles in establishing a hybrid TIN that would include both government and nongovernment analysts.

This report includes comments by TIN members only where specifically indicated in the text. The remainder of the document, including the recommendations, is attributable exclusively to the report authors.

Intelligence Community Progress on Outreach to Nongovernmental Sources

The TIN project is based on the premise that nongovernmental experts possess unique knowledge and experience that could substantially help government analysts better understand a broad range

³ Thomas Sanderson, David Gordon, and Guy Ben-Ari, *International Collaborative Online Networks: Lessons Identified from the Public, Private, and Nonprofit Sectors* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2008), http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,5166/type,0/.

of critical national security issues. Certain areas of the IC have too few (if any) 20-year veterans on particular accounts. To address this deficiency, parts of the IC have undertaken efforts in recent years to build relationships with specialists outside of government. Such outreach is not entirely new for some analysts and managers within the IC. This holds particularly true for the U.S. State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), which has been engaging outside expertise for many years. Because of its experience with outreach, INR was designated the IC's "Executive Agent" for outreach in the July 16, 2008, Intelligence Community Directive Number 205 (ICD 205/Analytic Outreach).⁴

More recently, the activities of the Office of the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Open Source, including its widely acclaimed annual Open Source Conference, have helped promote open sources and specialist outreach across the IC. Promotion of outreach by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), in conjunction with a widening recognition of the intrinsic value of outside expertise, has led to a series of encouraging programs. The ODNI's SHARP⁵ initiative, for instance, has shown promise through its engagement of leading subject-matter experts.

Importantly, most of the 16 agencies in the IC are actively establishing or expanding outreach efforts. These include the IC Associates program, funded by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and managed by INR, and the outreach initiatives of the National Security Agency (NSA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The intelligence components of the various military services, most notably the U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, also deserve credit for increasing their outreach efforts. All of these initiatives have been strengthened by the guidance on analytic outreach put forth in ICD 205.

Though steps in the right direction, these efforts provide only a few select analysts with systematic, formalized, and sustained access to tailored groups of U.S. and foreign nongovernmental experts. Nor have outreach efforts been sufficiently funded or supported by ODNI, ICD 205 notwithstanding. Instead, ODNI's emphasis on open source collection has, for the most part, driven outreach by default. This puts government analysts at a disadvantage by depriving them of critical subject-matter expertise residing outside the IC that could fill intelligence gaps and improve analysis.

Although ICD 205 is occasionally wielded as a club to advance networking with experts, for many parts of the IC, analytic outreach remains too burdensome to be practical. Competition for

⁴ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "Intelligence Community Directive Number 205, Analytic Outreach," July 16, 2008, http://www.dni.gov/electronic_reading_room/ICD%20205.pdf.

⁵ The DNI's Summer Hard Problems Program (SHARP) convenes two to four week sessions to "debate and analyze a problem of direct national security significance." Participants include the "US government, academia, private sector—along with state, local, and tribal law enforcement as appropriate." Thomas Fingar, SHARP Session Report, Washington, D.C., July 2007, p. i.

intelligence sources and the credit for bringing important information to policymakers have also helped sideline analytic outreach. Furthermore, counterintelligence concerns dampen the desire of those seeking outside perspectives. The resulting lack of outreach leaves analysts with a smaller, less diverse peer group. This limits analyst creativity and constrains the generation and consideration of alternative ideas—the engines of high-quality analysis that policymakers demand. Such shortcomings were indentified as contributing factors to the intelligence failures surrounding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program.

The TIN project offers a concrete example on the value of subject-matter experts and the management of open source expertise in two ways. First, by running a TIN, we sought to reinforce the argument that this model could provide the IC with one means of managing diverse, nongovernmental expertise. In this way, the TIN model presents the IC with an “out of the box” method for operationalizing analytic outreach called for in ICD 205. Second, by highlighting data and analyses drawn from the TIN exchanges, the project report illustrates the unique knowledge and insights held by nongovernmental experts (covering, in this case, Southeast Asia.)

Such perspectives, however, are of limited utility to the IC unless integrated into its workflow. For that reason, we have also added samples of TIN data and analyses to this report that vividly illustrate specific ways in which outside experts could improve collection and analysis tradecraft. We hope that the TIN model will motivate the IC to consider this and other forms of collective intelligence whose neglect has deprived analysts of sources and insight needed to confront serious threats.

How Did TIN-2 Operate?

The TIN-2 project began with two critical components: choosing the topic and relevant discussion questions and then selecting the best team of specialists for the forum. Discussion topics were developed through consultation with TIN’s senior advisory group, government analysts, and leaders from the private sector; prior CSIS staff knowledge of the subject matter; and, most importantly, through discussions with a range of experts on conflict, crime, extremism, society, and religion in Southeast Asia. The TIN member selection process was based on members’ publications and professional reputation and recommendations from trusted terrorism experts from around the globe. Ethnicity, religion, nationality, professional background, and linguistic capability were also taken into account to ensure diversity among the TIN-2 team and to discourage groupthink.

As the TIN-2 team fell into place, TNT staff prepared the technical aspect of the project. TIN-1 (Europe) used Groove Networks, a collaborative platform that was preinstalled on laptop computers that were distributed to TIN-1 members.⁶ Although adequate, the technology proved

⁶ For an in-depth examination of the TIN Europe network, see de Borchgrave, Sanderson, and Harned, *Force Multiplier for Intelligence: Collaborative Open Source Networks*, 30–38.

burdensome, prompting TNT to investigate alternate platforms. After researching a range of blogs, wikis, content management systems, and message boards, TNT selected a start-up company called Mind Alliance to custom build a Web-based content management system known as Clearspace. Although a clear improvement over the previous medium, some TIN-2 members had difficulty with this online interface. Ultimately, TIN-2 members preferred face-to-face exchanges over asynchronous, online discussions.

With the team assembled and the technology in place, TIN-2 members gathered at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney, Australia, for the TIN-2 kickoff meeting. There, members met one another and TNT staff in person, discussed their respective research, learned more about the TIN project, and oriented themselves on the TIN-2 Web site.

Following the Sydney meeting, the online “sharing phase” of the project began. During this nine-month phase, TIN-2 moderator Tom Sanderson posted a question every three to five weeks, and members would submit their responses or comments on one another’s ideas. Once each question or discussion topic appeared to have run its course, a summary of the content was placed into the TIN for clarification and adjustment. These summaries also helped TIN members review what took place in each prior discussion block.

Halfway through the TIN, Tom Sanderson and David Gordon visited Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, and Australia to meet with TIN members and to gain a deeper sense of the issues being discussed. This also served, where needed, to reenergize participation in the discussions. Importantly, TIN members facilitated interviews between Sanderson and Gordon and more than 35 people germane to the overall project topic. This included meetings with former members of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the founder of Laskar Jihad, a current member of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia, and also members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which took place at a MILF compound on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao. Sanderson and Gordon also interviewed military and intelligence officers, imams, journalists, lawyers, and NGO leaders.

Following the mid-term field trip in Southeast Asia, TIN discussions continued with additional topics and questions, some of which were submitted by members themselves. In November 2008, TIN members gathered in Singapore for a second and final discussion. Prior to the conference, TNT staff prepared one-page summaries of each discussion question and also requested that members submit four-page assessments on their areas of scholarship or fieldwork. During the Singapore conference, TIN members reviewed the online content summaries and discussed their experience in the project. This final meeting produced some of the most insightful exchanges of the entire project, and also some of the most helpful and candid feedback on the conduct of the TIN. The final three months of the project entailed a distillation of TIN comments, consideration of member feedback, and report writing.

2

MODERATOR'S NOTE

The TIN-2 project successfully demonstrated a viable method for engaging a diverse group of nongovernmental experts who possessed unique knowledge on an urgent national security topic. Although this project was run independently of any U.S. intelligence agency, it nonetheless demonstrated how governments could build collaborative networks around high-value, locally sourced subject matter expertise—a powerful yet underutilized asset. Centered around a series of questions on Islamist extremism, conflict, and criminality in Southeast Asia, TIN-2 provided many important lessons on collaborative outreach, reinforced the importance of nongovernmental perspectives, and effectively drew out highly valuable exchanges on the chosen topic. Over a 10-month period, TIN-2 managed to:

- assemble an elite, diverse, and trusted group of nongovernmental experts;
- organize these experts into an online network;
- retain the active participation of all but one of the original 14 members;
- stimulate frank debate and the exchange of information;
- produce a unique body of open source knowledge on transnational threats in Southeast Asia; and
- learn lessons on and improve the collaborative information process.

The details of these accomplishments are found in the pages ahead. While successful, the TIN-2 project was not without its challenges and shortcomings. These important lessons will undoubtedly shape future outreach programs. Four key lessons learned include:

Know the ultimate goal of any collaborative exercise from the outset and tailor your processes accordingly. As discussed in “TIN Applications for Intelligence,” open source networks could be used to perform a wide range of tasks. Given this variance it should come as no surprise that different approaches to assembling, incentivizing, operating, moderating, and aggregating data from a network often yield different results. Therefore, it is critical that the convener be mindful of the project’s goals from the beginning and shape and maintain the network accordingly.

Synchronous interaction is vital and should be the dominant method of collaboration. An overwhelming majority of TIN members felt that the asynchronous interaction via the TIN-2 Web site was less valuable and engaging than the project's face-to-face meetings. The Web site did serve a vital role as a means of capturing information from a geographically dispersed group of people operating on vastly different schedules and time zones. That being said, the project's asynchronous collaboration did not catalyze the same degree of dynamism and synergy that came with its real-time exchanges. Our experience strongly suggests that future collaborative networks should utilize face-to-face meetings, video and teleconferences, and live chat-room sessions. Asynchronous tools should still be deployed, but in a supplementary manner to real-time exchanges.

TIN data cannot be compressed unless a process is put in place to do so. Despite our best efforts, the substantive findings from the TIN-2 discussion could not be summarized in a manner that did the original exchanges justice and met with the approval of TIN members. This led us to the realization that TIN data cannot be condensed without introducing our own biases and depriving them of their contextual value. In order to avoid this problem and successfully aggregate and analyze TIN data, future efforts should include a formalized mechanism whereby TIN members evaluate compressed forms of their original submissions. Such quality-control mechanisms will entail an additional responsibility for TIN members and would likely require additional incentives. We feel that bringing an intelligence analyst into future TINs as a participating member could help circumvent the challenge of summarizing what is essentially incompressible data. For further explanation, see page 30.

TIN-2 was more valuable for the conveners than participants. In evaluating the project, many TIN members complained that though helpful on some level, the overall exercise was more valuable to CSIS than it was for them. While some of this criticism might have been ameliorated by introducing more synchronous and engaging modes of interaction, we believe that tangible incentives must reflect the degree to which TIN membership is seen by members as a cost rather than a benefit. For example, as TIN members are called on by the moderator to perform specific tasks that are of limited value to their own work—such as reviewing summaries of their own posts for editorial accuracy—the importance of adequate incentives increases.

While imperfect in some respects, we believe the overall success of the TIN-2 project illustrated why and how the IC should expand their outreach to nongovernmental experts. This report ends with some practical recommendations on how such an initiative could take place. We recognize that the ideas and guidance in this report may be a bridge too far for the IC, but we believe our efforts have stimulated a wider debate in government concerning the merits of collective intelligence networks.

—Thomas Sanderson, *TIN-2 Moderator*

3

THE PROBLEM...AND A SOLUTION

Transnational threats constitute many governments' most complex security challenges. They are as confounding, lethal, and capable as ever. The November 2008 Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) attack in Mumbai, India, which killed 164 people, serves as a potent reminder. In North Africa, operations conducted by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) against domestic and foreign targets have led to scores of casualties. "Al Qaeda Central" in Pakistan, under Osama bin Laden, continues to inspire fighters worldwide, direct propaganda efforts, provide training, and facilitate operations. Closer to the United States, Mexican narcotics gangs killed more than 6,000 people in 2008 as they battled to control the lucrative cocaine supply to America. Southeast Asia has seen significant gains against the Indonesia-based terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah, but other conflicts in the region defy solution. No matter the location, issue, or group, all of these problems test large, slow-moving, and underresourced intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Governments must think creatively to stay ahead of their adversaries. Identifying new sources of information—or improving access to existing ones—is one way to gain a distinct advantage.

The confrontation with transnational threats is difficult indeed; their flexible tactics, opaque organizational structures, ability to corrupt officials, and cross-border nature account for much of their success. Of increasing concern is their use of high-tech tools and emerging trends.¹ This allows extremists a degree of novelty and creativity in their operations that is difficult for governments to recognize and respond to.

¹ Modern trends aside, the ancient hawala money transfer system remains one of the most important tools for transnational terrorist groups. Interpol describes the hawala system as "an alternative or parallel remittance system. It exists and operates outside of, or parallel to 'traditional' banking or financial channels. The components of hawala that distinguish it from other remittance systems are trust and the extensive use of connections such as family relationships or regional affiliations. Unlike traditional banking...hawala makes minimal (often no) use of any sort of negotiable instrument. Transfers of money take place based on communications between members of a network of hawaladars, or hawala dealers." Patrick M. Jost and Harjit Singh Sandhu, *The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and Its Role in Money Laundering* (Lyon, France: Interpol, 2000), <http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/Hawala/default.asp#2>.

The Kashmiri separatist group LeT used satellite phones and GPS equipment to carry out their attack in Mumbai. Narcotics traffickers in Colombia ship drugs by mini-submarine and communicate safely with top-end encryption technology. These groups and others exploit global trade networks to smuggle people and illicit goods across borders and harness the Internet to distribute information, connect with like-minded individuals, and coordinate their activities. Al Qaeda's ability to forge a universally relevant message that fuses local grievances with a global struggle would not have been possible if not for the present era of interconnectedness.

These groups' advantages over law enforcement and intelligence are well-known but extremely difficult to neutralize. Outdated national security structures created for a state-centric world have proven largely inadequate against these cross-cutting dangers. In order to improve the capabilities to combat these transnational threats, governments must take advantage of outside experts with decades of relevant, on-the-ground experience. Unfortunately, governments' ability to reach out to new sources of knowledge remains highly problematic due to cultural, procedural, and legal barriers erected during the Cold War to combat a very different type of threat. Governments' lack of experience in using structured outreach to find, manage, and harness nongovernmental expertise further compounds this problem. The private sector, academia, and think tanks, however, have taken many different approaches to accessing knowledge wherever it may reside and can guide governments in doing the same.

Richard O'Neill, founder and director of the Highlands Group² and a senior adviser to the CSIS TIN project, has been leading an exploration of "collective intelligence"³ technologies and innovations for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence). This Collective Intelligence Forum has convened leading minds in the collective intelligence world to offer lessons on finding and using distributed expertise. Among the many examples of outreach is a company called InnoCentive. Through its Web site, InnoCentive anonymously connects "seekers," such as private sector corporations that need to solve a particular problem cheaply or outside their normal R&D efforts, with individual "solvers" who choose to tackle the posted problem,

² The Highlands Group is an international consulting network that has been interestingly termed an "intellectual capital venture firm" that draws on a network of subject matter experts and facilitates cross-disciplinary gatherings of creative thinkers, working with clients to bring ideas from the edge to the core. For the past 10 years, the Highlands Group has supported the Office of the Secretary of Defense through the Highlands Forum. Industry, academia, government, and professionals from a variety of fields share their knowledge and insights about the development and effects of technologies in the information realm. Some of the areas explored by the forum are emerging technologies, organizational development, economic competition, and the changing concept of security.

³ The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Center for Collective Intelligence defines collective intelligence as "Groups of individuals doing things collectively that seem intelligent;" and "How can people and computers be connected so that collectively they act more intelligently than any one individual, group, or computer has ever done before." MIT Center for Collective Intelligence, Handbook of Collective Intelligence, http://scripts.mit.edu/~cci/HCI/index.php?title=Main_Page.

regardless of qualifications. These problems range from the world of science to public policy, and roughly 37 percent of them have been solved, primarily by people without technical training in the problem's relevant area of expertise.⁴

InnoCentive and the CSIS TIN project, to be reviewed in detail in the pages ahead, are but two examples of the power of outreach and serve as effective guides for what intelligence agencies could be doing to better meet their own needs. Given the persistent and lethal nature of transnational threats, we believe the IC should strongly consider using TINs and other models of collective intelligence as a tool against a broad range of threats.⁵

⁴ Richard P. O'Neill, Highlands Collective Intelligence Forum, Executive Summary, December 12, 2009, 5.

⁵ For additional reading on collective intelligence and outreach, please see Clay Shirky, *Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing without Organizations* (New York: Penguin, 2008); Scott E. Page, *The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007); Jeff Howe, *Crowdsourcing* (New York: Crown, 2008); and James Surowiecki, *The Wisdom of Crowds* (New York: Random House, 2005).

4

TIN APPLICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE

Trusted information networks of nongovernmental experts could be an important compliment to the IC's open source collection and analysis efforts. The unique perspectives and on-the-ground experience of locally based, nongovernmental experts provides these networks with an inimitable ability to produce, collect, and interpret data from primary sources. These vital capabilities position TINs to make a tremendous contribution to the understanding of a range of threats that have otherwise proven difficult to address through more traditional means of collection and analysis.

Specifically, TINs could strengthen open source collection by:

- capturing unique data through multiple, local lenses;
- vetting data using subject matter experts;
- rapidly aggregating high-quality, open source data; and
- reading and communicating in local languages and dialects without heavy dependence on translators or translation software.

In addition to bolstering the collection phase of the intelligence cycle, a TIN could contribute to the analysis and production phase. Specifically, analysts could use TINs to act as a sounding board and critic during the analytic and production phase to:

- evaluate sources;
- challenge analytic assumptions;
- formulate new hypotheses;
- evaluate existing analytic hypotheses or conclusions; and
- generate alternative conclusions.

Although the IC was not involved in TIN-2, the project nonetheless highlighted ways in which such a network could assist the IC in the future. The following section will draw on concrete examples to illustrate this.

How TINs Add Value to Open Source Collection

As indicated previously, any TIN membership should be as varied as possible. The value of this diversity is best reflected in the broad range of opinions and data sources that members provide and cite in the TIN. By choosing members from a variety of religious, ethnic, linguistic, geographic, and professional backgrounds, TINs could widen the spectrum of information channeled into the IC. In addition to this array of perspectives, TINs draw on members' decades of experience to uniquely gather and analyze information. To use a technical analogy, while the IC's Open Source Enterprise can focus a great deal of bandwidth on commonly used frequencies, TINs can monitor obscure, weak signals that would oftentimes be overlooked or inaccessible to analysts.

Having operated TIN-2, we have accumulated a body of data that contains real-life examples of a TIN in action. The following section uses TIN member exchanges to highlight practical ways (noted above) in which a TIN can strengthen the collection phase of the intelligence cycle.

Capturing Unique Data

Members of TIN-2 are leading experts in their field. While this gives them analytic faculties that are highly valuable to intelligence analysts, it also means that their own personal and professional networks afford them access to sources of information that are often unavailable or unknown to intelligence analysts. Examples of such sources include personal contacts with primary sources, law enforcement and intelligence officials, unpublished notes from field work, or simply the experts' own thoughts. Because some of the information from these sources is not published in any form, it is inaccessible to intelligence analysts unless they directly interact with these experts.

The following comments were posted by a TIN member staying at a hotel in southern Thailand that was bombed by insurgents. This post, uploaded the morning after the attack, underscores the detail, uniqueness, timeliness, and overall value of the information such a network can offer.

Sunai Phasuk—March 17, 2008

Two bombs went off last night at the CS Pattani Hotel.

One bomb was placed in a restaurant toilet. Another one seemed to be hidden in a car in front of the hotel's famous teashop. One civilian, the hotel driver, was killed instantly. Another 14 were injured. The hotel owner, Anusas, who is also a Pattani senator, and Pares, a stringer for the *Nation*, were injured. The area was sealed off, and the phone signal was cut last night.

There was a gathering of [Barisan Revolusi Nasional–Coordinate] BRN-C elders in Pattani last Wednesday. During the meeting the elders were planning retaliatory attacks to the Army's sweep operations and assassinations of imams and cell leaders (mostly local politicians). Last night's attack on CS Pattani is a spine-chilling symbol that a new wave of

retaliatory attacks is coming. When a place like this (which has for a decade been regarded as a safe haven for all sides) is attacked, it shows a new level of determination of the militants to get back at all costs. No one and nowhere is spared.

I believe the militants planned to have more large bomb attacks last night. But one of their well-known bomb makers, Salahudin, was killed when two bombs he loaded in a pick-up truck went off prematurely in Yala market yesterday afternoon. Salahudin has two brothers, who are still at large with at least three 20 kilogram bombs somewhere out there. The Army is now sending helicopters out to conduct low altitude search for those bombs using sniffing devices, and check points are everywhere.

I spoke at length with police and military investigation teams. They revealed scary details about how the attack was carried out. First, a small bomb (2 kilograms) was detonated in a toilet behind the hotel restaurant to scare people, forcing them to run to the front of the hotel where many people were enjoying their usual evening tea. Then a bigger car bomb (20 kilograms) went off at that spot about ten minutes later. The authorities found another bomb (10 kilograms) hidden at the entrance of the hotel—apparently a final strike targeting police, soldiers, emergency teams, and onlookers who would come to the scene. Luckily, this bomb didn't explode.

Vetting Data

A TIN is not simply a group of experts who independently feed information to a central collector. Rather, TIN members provide information to one another as well as to those who establish and operate the network. This has important practical implications because it means that TIN data is effectively peer reviewed. When information is posted to the TIN, other members can see it and evaluate it. We witnessed time and again how members referred to previous postings and commented on them, at times challenging the underlying data or assumptions. Such a format acts as a corrective filter on the TIN's open source inputs. This benefit is conspicuously lacking from a model where nodes feed information directly to a central hub.

The following comments illustrate the self-correcting quality of a TIN in action. Prior to the excerpt below, a TIN member had asserted that militant groups in Thailand, such as BRN-C, neither engaged in criminal activity nor interacted with criminal groups. The same TIN member that previously reported on the Pattani Hotel bombing countered with:

Sunai Phasuk—September 17, 2008

Actually, connections between the network of BRN-C fighters and criminal activity have been exposed and analyzed by Thai authorities as more information emerges from the many arrests of criminal-turn-politicians.

Insurgents in southern Thailand have always been living and operating in multiple shades of the underworld. They can wear many hats at the same time—as mafia, drug traffickers, smugglers, gunmen, local politicians/administration officials, and insurgents. These

different roles are complementary to each other. Their criminal activity allows them to generate incomes and groom relationships with army, police, and civilian administration officials. From that point, they have contributed financial support to various aspects of insurgency (recruitment, training, procurement, and operations) and used relationships with government officials effectively as their protection.

Paisal Due-ramae is an example of this. He is a former chairman of the Paselas sub-district council in Narathiwat Province, and known to be involved in drug trafficking, smuggling, and money counterfeiting for many years. Recently, he has been monitored as a key coordinator between BRN-C leaders in Malaysia and insurgent cells in the south. He was arrested on August 25, 2008, in connection with the car bomb attack on August 21 in front of the police station in the Su Ngai Kolok district of Narathiwat province. Large amounts of cash in Thai baht, Malaysian ringgit, and fake U.S. dollars were found in his house, along with guns, car/motorcycle license plates, training material, etc. Someone like Paisal is believed to play an important role in acquiring boosters and other key components from Malaysia (as it has become extremely difficult to get dynamite, and Power Gel explosive from commercial rock mining companies in the south) for [improvised explosive device] IED production.

While the calibrating function of a TIN can be extremely beneficial, it is not without its challenges. For starters, it usually does not automatically produce a self-evident resolution or consensus among network members. In other words, when TIN participants comment on one another's thoughts, it is unlikely that a clear "right answer" will emerge.¹ As a result, it is up to the analyst to decide how to assess a string of comments. With additional prodding, however, an analyst could generate resolutions or identify information gaps that warrant additional collection. Sometimes this evaluation process will be simple, other times it will be quite difficult. For intelligence analysts trained to evaluate fragmentary and conflicting information, this task should be familiar.

Another challenge with a TIN's self-correcting quality is that it is not necessarily automatic. In order to intelligently evaluate one another's thoughts, TIN members need to read network content and take the time to formulate their responses. This will not happen unless a moderator has established the expectation that TIN members need to correct information that seems amiss and the members themselves feel adequately incentivized to do so.

The composition of a TIN and its topical focus can also determine how effective this process is. If a TIN is looking at such a broad issue that the expertise of its members does not overlap, the chances that members will feel comfortable critiquing one another's posts diminishes. Thus,

¹ Though, in the above example, the intervening TIN member clearly provided enough supporting evidence for the reader to effectively evaluate whether or not there was in fact an insurgent/criminal nexus in southern Thailand.

having complementary perspectives and appropriately defined topical boundaries are necessary preconditions for meaningful data checking within a TIN.

Rapidly Aggregating High-Quality Data

As a former senior CIA analyst familiar with the TIN project told us, one of the values of the TIN is that it compiles information that exists but hasn't yet been assembled. As such, a TIN serves as an integrator of vetted, open source information. An analyst could use this knowledge base to get up to speed on a particular issue or to selectively extract snippets of information to incorporate into a piece of analysis. In either case, a TIN could save the analyst time by providing them with a solid foundation on which to begin their analysis.

This integration process could be quite helpful to the IC. According to the same individual noted above, intelligence analysts often work under deadlines that inhibit their ability to conduct exhaustive research. By having a group of top experts create a body of information that is searchable, intelligence analysts could obtain reliable background data relatively quickly, leaving time for additional tasks.

The following excerpt from a larger post was written in response to TIN question number three, which discussed the dichotomy and convergence between local and global agendas among extremist groups. It demonstrates how a TIN can pull in relevant sources that would otherwise take significant time to identify and gather.²

Ishak Mastura—June 7, 2008

Based on what CSIS calls “research on research” and in my own quest for the link between ethno-nationalist insurgency and Islamic extremism (or the link between local and global agendas of Islamic extremists), here is a preliminary distillation of my research and my own thoughts on the matter to which I am open for debate.

1) Ethnic nationalism is an enduring force in the world and, as stated in the article “Us and Them, the Enduring Power of Ethnic Nationalism” by Jerry Muller (*Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2008), Americans generally belittle the role of ethnic nationalism in politics. Ethnic nationalism, however, corresponds to some enduring propensities of the human spirit. It is galvanized by modernization and, in one form or another, will drive global politics for generations to come. Once ethnic nationalism has captured the imagination of groups in a multiethnic society, ethnic disaggregation or partition is often the least bad answer.

2) Ethnic conflict stems from deep historical roots. Thus, they ultimately require “political solutions” since the use of military force can never achieve a lasting solution

² This TIN member posting included many other points and sources but was shortened due to space restrictions.

(Stofft, Gen. W. and Guertner, G., *Ethnic Conflict: Implications for the Army of the Future*, U.S. Army War College, March 14, 1994). At best, military force can only accomplish temporary containment of violence and contribute to an environment that permits the establishment of political conditions or institutions that lead to a more lasting solution (ibid).

3) In relation to point number two, there is an imperative to engage—in peace negotiations, peace-building, or other mechanisms of conflict resolution—non-state actors and ethno-nationalist liberation movements in Muslim insurgencies and arrive at a political compromise before “Chechenization” happens (Stepanova, E., *Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological and Structural Aspects*, SIPRI, 2008).

Not all comments of this kind must highlight relevant research. In some cases, the most interesting information from a given post was original content written by a TIN member. The response below to the TIN’s multipart question number four on “foreign extremist influence” exemplifies this.

Sally Neighbour—June 22, 2008

As others have examined Southeast Asia, I will confine myself to Australia.

Q: Who is being targeted?

A: Here, those who have been “targeted” (although I think it’s as much a bottom-up as top-down process) are principally members of the second and third generation Middle Eastern Diaspora communities in the large cities, particularly Sydney and Melbourne. These communities are predominantly Lebanese Muslim but also include Egyptians, Algerians, Syrians, Jordanians, and others. This group exhibits all the factors identified by the New York City Police Department and Marc Sageman that make them vulnerable to radicalization. These factors include alienation from their land of ethnic origin, the culture of their parents/grandparents, and the wider Australian society; socio-economic disadvantage; and perceived discrimination and victimization, among others. Another Diaspora community that was successfully targeted in the 1990s was the Indonesian Muslim immigrant community, especially in Sydney and Melbourne. These communities were infiltrated and cultivated by the leaders of JI, Sungkar and Ba’asyir, primarily as a fund-raising and support base. This group was effectively neutralized (as far as we can tell) by police/intelligence raids in the aftermath of the 2002 Bali bombings.

Q: What is being used to reach them? Money, literature, internet, personal contact/missionary activities, student exchanges, training abroad?

A: Personal contact and missionary activities have been the most crucial factors here. In the case of the “Arab” community, key players in this have included the Jordanian immigrant Sheik Mohammed Omran, a.k.a. Abu Ayman, leader of the Ahlus Sunnah wal Jemaah Association. Omran moved to Australia in the 1980s, and has had close personal contacts with significant figures in the international Islamist movement such as Abu

Qatada in the United Kingdom and Abu Dahdah in Spain. Another player is the Lebanese born Bilal Khazal, who founded the (Australian) Islamic Youth Movement and its influential and far-reaching magazine *Nida Ul Islam*, which in its early days featured interviews with the likes of bin Laden, Abu Qatada, and Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman (the blind sheik). Khazal was identified in a Spanish court case as being a recruiter of mujahidin in Australia, and named in a Philippines intelligence report as “al Qaeda’s chief representative in Australia.” These and other individuals (another is the Algerian-born Abdul Nacer Benrika, currently on trial in Melbourne), have played a central role in recruitment and radicalization in Australia, through their physical presence and aggressive proselytizing here. Likewise, the establishment of the JI jemaah in Australia was a direct result of frequent visits to Australia by JI’s founders Sungkar and Ba’asyir, who built up a strong personal following among the Indonesian Muslim community—especially in Sydney and Melbourne. This following proved crucial to JI’s presence in Australia.

Q: Which foreign entities are conducting these activities?

A: You name it. JI, al Qaeda, LET, the Lebanese Tawhid movement (of which Khazal was a principal), Hizbut Tahrir, Jemaah Tabligh, and the gamut of Salafist/jihadist groups flowing from the Middle East.

Q: What is the outcome or impact of this influence?

A: The outcome has been twofold. One effect has been the emergence of a small number of individuals who have been willing to join conspiracies to undertake terrorist acts in Australia such as the Jack Roche plot to bomb the Israeli embassy in 2000 or the alleged plans to attack major sports events that are currently the subject of criminal trials in Melbourne and Sydney. Another effect has been to create a wider passive support base whose members would not undertake terrorist acts themselves, but who subscribe in principle to the ideology of violent jihad and thus provide an “enabling community” (to use Louise Richardson’s phrase) in which the activists/potential terrorists are able to comfortably exist. This is, of course, further promoted by other factors, especially the Internet, and the participation of a few individuals in military training activities abroad (principally with LET and JI) who bring their training and indoctrination back with them to share with others.

Q: Where is this trend increasing or decreasing?

A: It is hard to say whether this trend is increasing or decreasing. Certainly individuals like Omran and Khazal have pulled their heads in and reined back their publicly visible activities because of intense police/intelligence scrutiny and, in Khazal’s case, criminal charges. Since the Pendennis arrests in 2004, there have been no further alleged terrorist plots uncovered, and legislation proscribing the dissemination of terrorist related materials has further curbed their activities. However, it would be surprising if similar activity was not still occurring out of public view.

This example illustrates how a TIN can quickly pull together relevant and vetted open source information. For busy intelligence analysts, this resource could prove quite helpful. Few other mediums of exchange deliver a similar compilation of targeted and searchable data.

Reading and Communicating in Local Languages

In order to accomplish its missions, the IC must have the capacity to effectively interpret information from a multitude of linguistic and cultural origins. Despite this requirement, the IC's foreign language capacity remains inadequate. Although there have been some important efforts to ameliorate this shortcoming, legacy rules still prevent many first generation Americans and recent immigrants with crucial linguistic skills and cultural sensibilities from joining the analytic workforce. TINs could help the IC overcome this critical deficiency by allowing analysts who lack these faculties to work with individuals who possess native language skills and a nuanced understanding of local culture. Given that "Regional and national problems related to human intent will typically benefit from being addressed by experts immersed in the attendant culture and language," this contribution should not be overlooked.³ The following excerpt from a TIN post demonstrates the variety of locally sourced media and relevant individuals that can be accessed by native or acculturated specialists.

Najib Azca—September 27, 2008

I will highlight the role of media in influencing and provoking people to join jihad. In my interviews with several people who decided to join jihad in Ambon and Poso, I found that media played an important role in creating and inflaming the sense of grievance which lead them to join jihad. The news of the "Tobelo massacre" in North Maluku, which resulted in hundreds of Muslims killed in a mosque, or the "Kilo 9" incident in Poso, which resulted in about one hundred Muslim deaths, are among the popular narratives frequently cited by post-jihadists. In addition to published or televised news of "Muslim persecution by Christians," public preaching by Islamist activists from the conflict area is another effective method of marshalling support to join jihad.

Some post-jihadists frequently refer to Islamist media such as *Sabili* and *Republika* for publishing stories about the bloody conflicts in Ambon and Poso that eventually provoked them to join jihad. As these conflicts unfolded in the early period following the collapse of [the] authoritarian regime of Suharto, the media freely published their own version of these stories in somewhat partial and partisan ways. This news put flame to the dried grass of the Islamic youth who had a strong strand of "machismo" in their culture.

³ Gregory Treverton and Bryan Gabbard, *Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2008), http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2008/RAND_TR293.pdf.

These are the narratives I got from senior leaders of Brigade Hizbullah in Solo and FPI (the Islamic Defender Front) in Pekalongan.

I heard another interesting story while conducting interviews with an Afghan veteran who joined jihad from the Netherlands where he had been studying aeronautics. He told me that he was shocked and very much moved by an Islamist publication that described how several women and children were killed during a Soviet operation in a Kabul market. He was a smart young guy who received a scholarship to study aeronautics. He also had a traditional Islamic background but was experiencing a loss of identity in the early years of his overseas studies. He then made the radical decision to join jihad in Afghanistan on his own—which he self-financed—even though he did not have any established contacts on the ground.

How TINs Add Value to Open Source Analysis and Production

As analysts convert raw data into finished intelligence, they could draw on a TIN to conduct a wide range of tasks that help ensure accurate and rigorous analysis. Such tasks could be incorporated formally or informally at various points throughout the analysis and production phase to help analysts produce the best possible product.

The diversity of a TIN is as much an asset for the analysis and production phase as it is during the collection phase. By approaching the same set of unclassified data with a different set of assumptions, TIN members could generate new interpretations—or test existing ones—exposing potential analytic flaws. Here again, a TIN’s “local lens” could be tremendously beneficial to the IC. The multiple viewpoints represented in a TIN could help analysts avoid the potentially distortive biases associated with a relatively homogeneous group or, at the very least, flag “mainstreaming” as it emerges. This could keep groupthink in check and promote a more robust analytic process.

Compared to the collection phase of the intelligence cycle, the use of a TIN in the analysis and the production phase would require a highly dynamic discussion with a proactive and engaged analyst. Why it is critical that an analyst be active will be discussed at the end of this section. In the meantime, we will outline additional ways in which a TIN could help IC analysts.

Evaluating Sources

In order for information to be converted into accurate finished intelligence, analysts must be able to separate reliable facts from inaccurate data. This requires that they have the capability to effectively evaluate a wide range of sources, often without the benefit of a local context. By providing multiple local lenses, a TIN could provide IC analysts with a reliable means of

evaluating data from a variety of open sources as they are incorporated into finished analysis. The following posts from the online free discussion space illustrate this capability.⁴

Sidney Jones—March 16, 2008

Kit Collier forwarded the following from the *Philippines Inquirer*. Any news story quoting Philippine police sources about JI is usually wrong (i.e., Dulmatin’s numerous deaths).

Ishak Mastura—March 16, 2008

Sidney is right about the doubtful veracity of Philippine police reports regarding JI because of their propensity to seek out publicity coups and worse to justify collecting reward money from the U.S. government.

Greg Fealy—March 23, 2008

I also note reporting in the Indonesian press that the Filipino and Indonesian police forces are going to share DNA databases in order to enable faster identification of all the corpses that the Filipino authorities say are Dulmatin, but who seem always to be someone else! In their public statements, the Indonesian police usually express skepticism about any statement issuing from their Filipino counterparts and in the case of the DNA initiative the disdain of the Indonesians was barely concealed.

Scrutinizing Underlying Analytic Assumptions

The foundation of any analytic exercise is the underlying assumptions on which it is based. Sometimes these assumptions can be incorrect, which negatively affects the subsequent analysis. The Robb/Silberman Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, for example, argued that the intelligence failures in the lead-up to the Iraq war were “In large part the result of analytical shortcomings; intelligence analysts were too wedded to their assumptions about Saddam’s intentions.”⁵

These assumptions had a strong and ultimately decisive influence on the ability of analysts to correctly analyze the data concerning Iraq’s WMD program. Had there been a greater effort to engage outside experts who did not share these flawed assumptions, this catastrophic intelligence failure might have been avoided. Outside experts could offer the analytic corps one way to constantly test well-worn analytical “givens” so that these potentially dangerous assumptions do not remain unaddressed.

⁴ A TIN’s ability to evaluate sources is virtually identical to its ability to vet open source information, as described on page 13. Because, however, both capabilities contribute to distinct phases in the intelligence cycle, we are treating them as discrete capabilities.

⁵ The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States, March 31, 2005, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/wmd_report.pdf, 3.

The following three posts illustrate how a TIN could challenge an analytic assumption. In the first post, TIN-2 member Giora Eliraz lists several radical ideologists in his response to a question about the role individual leaders/preachers play in generating the conceptual frame and mobilizing people for violence. In the second post, Waleed Aly challenges the underlying assumptions behind Giora's list. Giora then responds to Waleed's challenge by explicitly stating the assumptions on which his list is based. While there is no right or wrong answer here, this exchange highlights a TIN's ability to scrutinize assumptions by forcing participants to critically examine and defend their underlying views.

Giora Eliraz—August 22, 2008

Radical ideologists, leaders of radical groups and extreme preachers have played a very significant and sometimes dominant role in the contemporary narrative of Islamic radicalism. The milestones of radical thought have been placed by ideologists to inspire radical Muslims everywhere. Among these radical ideologists are included, for example, the Egyptian Hassan al-Banna (1906–1948), the founder of Jamaat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Society of the Muslim Brothers); the Pakistani Maulana Abu'l a'la Maududi (1903–1979), one of the most significant forefathers of contemporary radical thought; the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), who had a very significant impact on the development of radical jihadi thought; the Egyptian Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj (1952–1982), the founder of Tanzim al-Jihad (Jihad Organization), the group that assassinated Egypt's President, Anwar Sadat, and the author of *Al-Farida al-Ghaiba (The Forsaken Duty)*, who posited jihad as the sixth pillar of Islam; the Sudanese Dr. Hassan al-Turabi (1932–), whose roots are anchored in the Sudanese branch of the Muslim Brothers; the Palestinian Jordanian, Dr. Abdullah Yusuf Azzam (1941–1989), the significant ideological voice of the mujahidin in Afghanistan, whose writings have played a significant role in globalization of jihad; and the Egyptian Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri (1951–), often described as the second-in-command of al Qaeda.

Due to the critical role played by certain personalities in the trajectory of Islamic radicalism in general, and in the foundation and leadership of radical groups and movements in particular, the names of some radical organizations and their founders are said almost in the same breath. Examples include the Muslim Brothers and Hassan al-Bana; Jama'at-i-Islami and Maulana Abu'l a'la Maududi; Jama'at al-Muslimin (publicly known as Takfir w'al-Hijra) and Shukri Mustafa (1942–1978); and al Qaida and Osama Bin Ladin. In the Indonesian context, for example, the case of Laskar Jihad and Ja'far Umar Thalib is salient.

Waleed Aly—August 26, 2008

I think whenever we are addressing the topic of radical ideologues in Islamic thought we run the risk of conflation. Indeed, it seems to be a problem with almost any of the terms that appear frequently in the discourse. So, for example, we sometimes use a term like “Islamism” to connote a violent political ideology, which blinds us to the fact of its

diversity. Many Islamists—probably most—are not particularly interested in pursuing violence. The term is broad enough to cover movements and thinkers that are pro-democracy and anti-democracy. It encompasses those who are thoroughly misogynist and those who are relatively equitable in gender terms, and so on.

So it is when we come to consider Islamist thinkers. I would argue that from a theological point of view they are all “radical” in the sense that they exhibit a tendency to depart significantly from traditional Islamic thought, and do so with a discourse of returning to Islam’s most foundational roots. The politicization of Islam to the point of ideology is undoubtedly radical. But this does not necessarily mean Islamist thinkers are invariably radical in the political sense that is often intended.

Accordingly, I think it is important to recognize that there are very significant political and intellectual differences between, for example, Osama bin Laden and Hassan al-Turabi or between Sayyid Qutb and Abu’l a’la Mawdudi. Certainly, we can characterize these all as Islamist thinkers. But Mawdudi and al-Turabi have articulated pro-democracy positions. Qutb, like bin Laden, proposed a complete uprooting of what he termed the jahiliyya system, whereby a pious vanguard would simply Islamicize the society from the top down, Leninist-style. Mawdudi not only accepted the idea of democracy but also pretended Islam somehow invented it.

Similarly, the militancy of Qutb’s discourse is visible on the surface. Mawdudi’s approach to violence is much more subtle and complex. In some passages, he eschews the idea of violence all together, constructing jihad as an extremely broad social and spiritual context. Elsewhere, he appears to talk of jihad in quasi-socialist terms—as a struggle for justice and against oppression that would occasionally take on a military expression. He did not, however, at least as far as I can tell, promote a view of perpetual violent conflict between Islam and jahiliyya in a way that remotely approaches Qutb’s ideological leanings.

Personally, I think a more useful grouping might be Qutb, Faraj, Azzam, bin Laden, and Zawahiri. These are very different figures from al-Banna and Mawdudi.

Giora Eliraz—September 7, 2008

As to your implicit comment about the problematic nature of an attempt to mention the given set of ideologists in the same breath: I am aware of the differences of opinion within this group but, from my perspective, the common denominator is based on some similar conceptual contours, rather than their attitudes toward violence. Examples of these conceptual contours include self-truthfulness and other-wrongness; a marginalized attitude toward the “other”; a belief in Muslim hegemony over non-Muslims; a denial of the liberal ideal of equality among citizens; an exclusive approach; a worldview and deep conviction that Islam is both religion and state; a strong denial of the democratic idea of the people as the ultimate source of the authority; and a view of the world as a conflict between “good” and “evil.”

I also wonder if the term “democratic” can be used in the case of certain Islamic movements that, though they participate in the democratic process, might end democracy once they came to power. The formative statement of the Muslim Brothers, founded by Hassan al-Banna, that only two types of political parties exist—the “Party of God” (Hisb Allah) and the “Party of Satan” (Hisb al-Shaytan)—has inspired radical fundamentalists throughout the world.

Indeed, generalizations often to lead to simplification and biases. Nevertheless it seems to me that it is possible, in the context of a history of ideas, to make a sort of generalization that includes these ideologues. In this context one can identify, through a broader historical perspective, some lines that are extended, either overtly or in a hidden way, between formative ideologues that might not be zealous and current but are nonetheless responsible for radical trends in Islamic extremism.

Formulating New Hypotheses

Whereas previous examples drawn from the TIN demonstrated the value of a diverse group of individuals offering their own discrete analyses and information, it is also possible to produce a novel hypothesis that emerges from a dynamic discussion. Such exchanges would allow an analyst to jointly develop hypotheses with TIN members. This aspect of the TIN underscores the value of collaboration and highlights the synergy that comes with it. The following discussion—from TIN question number two: What are the dynamics of realignment among extremist groups in the region?—illustrates this process in action.

Muhammad Haniff Hassan—March 17, 2008

Since 1997, the Egyptian al-Gamaah al-Islamiyah (GI), the organization that first inspired JI, has revised its strategy. The group still maintains its Islamist character but has forgone violent means, instead preferring non-violent propagation. This decision came in the aftermath of the Luxor attack and took place four years before 9/11. Not much publicity was made about it. A few years after this revision and before 9/11 JI was geared by Hambali toward military operations and all non-military operations were put to a stop.

Why was JI not affected by GI’s revision? Did they not know about the revision? If JI knew about the revision, why did it choose the path of al Qaeda? (Some interesting questions).

After 9/11, a leader of Tanzim Jihad in Egypt took similar steps as the leaders of the Egyptian al-Gamaah al-Islamiyah. A series of his views were published which forced Ayman al Zawahiri to recently offer his response in a 200-plus page book.

Both revisions, however, received resistance from some members of organizations within Egypt and those which are based outside, especially among individuals who have joined al

Qaeda. I've read materials published by the above two revisionist strands and my conclusion is:

1. Their revision is more due to self-reflection than a systematic rehabilitation program. This, however, does not mean that a rehabilitation program is of no use. They are useful, but in this case, the revision occurred more because of self-reflection and introspection.
2. I do agree with observers that the revisions are sincere and not merely a pragmatic change of tactic forced by circumstances.

Sidney Jones—March 17, 2008

Al-gamaah al-islamiyah changed because of the public outrage over Luxor; the most important factor in its introspection was the obvious loss of popular support. We see a very similar analysis of the impact of Bali I from Abu Rusdan (sometimes spelled Rusydan), and separately, from Ali Imron, one of the bombers, who conclude Bali was counterproductive because it didn't have popular support behind it. This conclusion led Abu Rusdan to try to get the JI leadership to focus more on dakwah and education, and on Ali Imron to decide to cooperate with police. It also led JI as an organization to distance itself from Noordin Mohammed Top.

Anthony Bubalo—March 18, 2008

I would like to make a few points on the episodes of ideological reassessment Muhammad refers to—GI in the later 1990s and the more recent revisions published by Sayyed al-Imam from Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)—and how these potentially relate to fragmentation amongst jihadists.

Firstly, GI revision came after its leadership understood that the violent campaign it had waged through much of the 1990s in Egypt had failed. The reassessment occurred in prison and, as Muhammad notes, was very much the product of self-reassessment. I disagree that the Egyptian government played only a limited role in this rehabilitation process. It was critical, for example, in facilitating discussions between Islamic scholars and the GI leadership. Once this had led to a reassessment amongst the leadership, the government facilitated the movement of these leaders through the various prisons in which many members of the movement were incarcerated. This allowed these leaders to explain and build support for the reassessment amongst the rank and file. There was also some effort by the Egyptian government to provide economic opportunities for GI members as they were gradually released.

In fact, I think if you are looking for models for a sensible and nuanced approach to the often problematic issue of terrorist rehabilitation, then the Egyptian example should not be overlooked.

Secondly, I don't know why specifically the GI reassessment did not influence Indonesia. But you have to remember that al Qaeda itself was in some ways a product of the reassessment—albeit a negative one. I believe that al Qaeda, in the form that launched the 9/11 attacks, really only took shape when Ayman al-Zawahiri and bin Laden found themselves together again in Afghanistan and announced in 1998 the formation a “World Islamic Front.” I think it is not coincidental that al-Zawahiri, a key leader of EIJ, launched a new, externally focused campaign of jihad with bin Laden at precisely the same time as the largest Egyptian jihadist organization (with which Zawahiri and EIJ worked fairly closely) was basically giving up on an internally-focused campaign of jihad inside Egypt.

In short, failure in Egypt against “the near enemy” in part produced a new initiative to fight “the far enemy.” In 2002 there was a very famous exchange between al-Zawahiri and Montasser el-Zayat who was a lawyer for GI and a strong supporter of the reassessment. El-Zayat not only strongly condemned 9/11 and tried to put some distance between GI and al Qaeda (for obvious reasons), but also argued that al-Zawahiri had launched himself into al Qaeda only because he was no longer able to continue the fight in Egypt.

It may be that JI was not aware of the GI assessment; or it may simply be that they decided that the al Qaeda/Zawahiri evolution of the jihadist struggle was the right path to follow. The irony is of course that many similar groups in the Middle East did not join with al Qaeda; most of GI and a good proportion of EIJ—to say nothing of other groups like Hamas and the various other branches of the Muslim Brotherhood—rejected al Qaeda's call to arms. What this points to is what I see as a critical factor in fragmentation: the tension between local and global aims.

This brings me to my third and final point. Al Qaeda's ideology was one designed by people who had lost contact with their original political and social milieu—they were, to use Olivier Roy's description “de-territorialized.” They had no choice but to fight against the West because their fight to build Islamic states in their own Muslim societies had ended or had changed. But this also explained why, at least initially, few if any militant Islamists in the Middle East joined al Qaeda. They were still rooted in their societies, and still saw their cause in terms of the transformation of these societies even if they were reassessing the tactics by which they would pursue their aims.

This also explains why the al Qaeda ideology appeals to second generation Muslims living in the West. Again as Roy has noted, it makes no sense for them to try to pursue the classical Islamist goal of building Islamic states because they live in predominantly non-Muslim countries. All that is left for those looking for a militant agenda is to fight the West.

For the few organizations like JI that joined al Qaeda but were not de-territorialized, al Qaedism eventually throws up a conundrum. Namely, do you follow the al Qaeda model and fight against the West or do you focus on more local concerns—building an Islamic state, “protecting” the local Muslim community from non-Muslims, etc. Each model

comes with a different strategy: if you choose the former you target embassies, hotels and other places where Westerners congregate; if you choose the latter you do things aimed at building local support and a constituency, though these can still be violent, e.g. participating in sectarian conflict or military attacks on the government.

The problem with the al Qaeda approach is that it usually ends up killing a lot more locals than it does Westerners. If you are not yourself a local or are committed to the al Qaeda approach you care less about this—as long as you are killing Westerners in the process. But if you are yourself a local and have local connections and ambitions then this eventually becomes untenable for all but a small ideological hard-core. Most organizations will not sacrifice the local for the global. So what you get is what happened in Iraq, where local Sunnis turned against their former al Qaeda allies (many of whom were foreigners) because they understood that they would have to live in Iraq—and live with the consequences, including political consequences—of their actions long after the al Qaeda fighters had left. I think the JI splits that Sidney has documented are also evidence of this tension.

In the end all politics is local...

Greg Fealy—March 20, 2008

This is an interesting discussion. What occurs to me, particularly when reading Haniff's postings on this, is to ask whether JI has ever been tightly bound to following the example of overseas groups. Clearly, at various times, sections of JI have been inspired and galvanized by the example of al Qaeda, but their doctrinal orientation has always seemed to have had a certain eclecticism to it. I am struck, for example, in reading the writings of Imam Samudra and especially Mukhlas, how diverse their references are. Mukhlas, in one of his prison manuscripts, lists a wide range of "influential figures" who shaped his thinking, including bin Laden, Qutb, Azzam, Ibn Taymiyya, Moh. Natsir and Hasyim Asy'ari! Thus, I'm not sure that the more militant JI leaders would be greatly troubled by developments within GI as there are plenty of new examples of jihadist ardor which they can turn to. Witness, for example, the proliferation of translations of books by Maqdisi and Zarqawi. No Indonesians seem to have gone to Iraq to join the insurgency but nonetheless they admire the example set by these jihadists.

Sally Neighbour—April 10, 2008

A few observations in response to the group discussion as to why JI did not follow the GI reassessment. I think both local and global factors were crucial here. At the same time that GI was handling the aftermath of the Luxor attack, JI was moving in precisely the opposite direction—toward al Qaeda—for a combination of local/global reasons. These include:

1. The fall of Suharto, which caused Bashir and Sungkar to return to Indonesia and re-double their efforts to achieve an Islamic state

2. The death of Sungkar and his replacement by Bashir, a weaker leader who lacked the same level of support
3. The ascendance of Hambali, who personified the strong personal and organizational links forced between JI and al Qaeda in Pakistan/Afghanistan
4. The outbreak (as a result of Suharto's fall and the resulting erosion of central authority) of sectarian conflicts in Ambon and Sulawesi, which provided a local training/breeding ground for JI (akin to a mini Afghanistan in Indonesia)
5. The Philippine armed forces attack on the MILF/JI training camp Abubakar in Mindanao, which was the catalyst for JI's first al Qaeda style attack.

In the late 1990s there was intense debate within JI over whether or not it should begin to use terrorism as a tactic. Importantly—and I take up Anthony's point about people who have become “de-territorialized”—the push for violent jihad (or, to be more precise, for attacks on Christian foreigners, as all of JI supported killing Christians in Ambon and Sulawesi) came principally from the exiles who had spent many years in Pakistan/Afghanistan and Malaysia, and for whom Indonesia was no longer “home.” The terrorism campaign was led by Hambali from Mantiqi 1 in Singapore/Malaysia, while the leaders of Mantiqi 2, who had stayed at home in Indonesia throughout the Suharto years, remained predominantly committed to a long-term fight for an Islamic state and were deeply ambivalent about launching al Qaeda-style attacks. When Hambali was ready to begin the terror campaign he simply bypassed Mantiqi 2 and its more “conservative” leaders. Since Bali 1, JI has gone pretty much full circle on this. Mantiqi 1 has been more or less wiped out, terrorism has been judged by most to be a failed (or at least counter-productive) tactic, and the group has reverted to the original Mantiqi 2 objective of campaigning long-term for an Islamic state.

Clearly, this process does not generate neatly packaged hypotheses that intelligence analysts could quickly incorporate into their reporting. Instead, it produces an evolving set of views that an analyst would have to scrutinize and evaluate before integrating into his or her own work. By having TIN members parry with one another, the analyst could watch new ideas emerge and, if so inclined, intervene at various points to challenge comments, clarify certain points, or simply keep the conversation on track.

Evaluating Existing Analytic Hypotheses or Conclusions

TINs could also assist in the analysis and production phase of the intelligence cycle by providing a sounding board for an analyst's hypotheses and conclusions. An analyst might say to TIN members, “how could I be thinking differently about this problem?” or “this is why I think Jemaah Islamiyah is not a threat—am I right?” This would effectively introduce an element of quasi-peer review into the intelligence cycle, allowing an analyst to draw on the deep contextual

knowledge of TIN members to strengthen their own analysis. This process could take place as an ongoing conversation between the analyst and the TIN as well as through some form of a “red team/team B” challenge exercise.

The ability of a TIN to effectively evaluate external hypotheses can clearly be seen in the following exchanges. The catalyst for this discussion was an article written by a specialist on Southeast Asian extremism in March of 2008, which suggested that the recent elections in Malaysia could result in the provision of a cross-border safe haven to Muslim extremist groups operating on Malaysian-Thai border. A TIN senior adviser posted this article and asked TIN members to evaluate this theory.

Joseph Liow—March 12, 2008

I’m sorry, but I have to humbly disagree with the author on this one. There is absolutely no basis to believe that the PAS [Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party] state administration will be actively supporting the insurgency in the south. Mind you, Kelantan has been in PAS hands for some time now, not just overnight. Furthermore, the Kedah and Perak state assemblies, while under PAS Minter Bear (Chief Minister—in the case of Perak there are some problems though), is a coalition of three opposition parties, and PAS will in no way be calling the shots on their own. Even if they did, there is no evidence that they will be actively supporting the insurgency. What PAS has been doing is condemning the Thai government, expressing sympathy for the “oppressed” Malay-Muslim population in southern Thailand, and arguing that if further oppression takes place the Malay-Muslims should stand up against it. I am not sure that this amounts to active support of the insurgency.

Of course, we are all aware of the connections between Kelantan and Narathiwat. It is also clear that many militants, particularly former separatists, reside in Kelantan. Bache for instance, has a huge “Orange Siam” (Thai) and “Orange Malaya Siam” (Thai-Malay) community, much of whom are Malaysian as well as Thai. As far as the Malaysian authorities are concerned, these people hold only one citizenship—Malaysian (after the communist insurgency the Malaysian government stopped the policy of dual citizenship because many Malaysians were also holding Chinese citizenship). This has made it very difficult for Thai-Malaysian cooperation because, as far as the Malaysians are concerned, any pressure from the Thais to turn over apprehended suspects can be rebuffed on that basis.

The Malaysian government will undoubtedly be under pressure to express sympathy for the Malay-Muslims of southern Thailand for a wide variety of reasons, including co-religious and co-ethnic affiliation. Given the porous nature of the border, it should not come as a surprise that insurgents can get across to Malaysia fairly easily, thus making counterinsurgency on the Thai side all the more difficult. Moreover, there are possibly political costs for the Malaysian government if they are seen to be complicit in hardline Thai counterinsurgency policies. On the other hand, Malaysia does have an important

role to play, not least as a location for possible dialogue between insurgents and the Thai government.

In short, the Malaysian connection to the southern Thai insurgency is a very complex and complicated one which is very difficult to piece together. It certainly isn't as simple as PAS wins northern states so they will provide assistance. The people running the state government in Kelantan are not fanatics; they are fully aware of the problems associated with the Thai insurgency. For one, given the heavy speculation of JI involvement in the insurgency (which remains ungrounded as far as I am concerned) they are mindful of the need to distance themselves from the situation. Second, they are also aware of the problems they will face if there is a massive exodus of Thais across the border, as was the case somewhat a few years ago. I spoke in detail with Husam Musa, Vice-President of PAS, a few days ago and they have great plans to build a Kelantan growth corridor, with investments from Kuala Lumpur and Bangsar-based multi-national corporations, in order to cement their rule in Kelantan. They are not going to jeopardize this by being seen to be in cahoots with the southern Thai insurgents, at least not knowingly.

Sidney Jones—March 13, 2008

Joseph's points are well-taken. No one I've spoken to suggests that the elections will lead to greater protection for Thai insurgents. In addition, the article's author is wrong to suggest that the primary driver of Indian discontent were the apostasy rulings. The official reason cited by Hindraf, the ethnic Indian "action force" that led the 2007 demonstrations, was the government's "unofficial policy of temple demolition" as well as "concerns about the steady encroachment of sharia-based law." But more generally the Indian community is angered over discrimination in jobs and education that keeps them relegated to second-class status. For more on this see www.hindraf.co.uk.

Generating Alternative Conclusions

In an excellent essay by Warren Fishbein and Gregory Treverton titled Rethinking "Alternative Analysis" to Address Transnational Threats, the authors argue that "Intelligence Community analytic organizations need to institutionalize sustained, collaborative efforts by analysts to question their judgment and underlying assumptions, employing both critical and creative modes of thought."⁶ The above example illustrates how a TIN can provide this "critical mode of thought." A TIN can also yield the "creative modes of thought" that produce alternative competing hypotheses from one set of data. This "what if" approach helps promote rigorous analysis by enabling outside experts to introduce new explanations for a given trend, allowing the analyst to make a more informed judgment. Although we did not ask TIN-2 members to examine

⁶ Warren Fishbein and Gregory Treverton, *Rethinking "Alternative Analysis" to Address Transnational Threats*, Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Occasional Papers 3, no. 2 (October 2004), <https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/vol3no2.htm>.

a discrete hypothesis and formulate alternative explanations, we nonetheless feel that this is an important contribution that such a network can have.

Analyst Involvement

In order for the IC to extract the maximum value from a TIN, it is vital that its analysts be actively involved in the network. The reason for this is twofold. First, TIN findings are very difficult to aggregate and summarize without editorializing. In other words, the content generated in a TIN or other collaborative Web site can not be accurately condensed without making editorial judgments that TIN members would likely object to. This reality became clear at the closing conference in Singapore in November 2008, when TNT staff presented key findings from each discussion question as one-page, bulleted summaries. TIN members felt that these summaries—largely verbatim, abbreviated posts by members—were highly problematic because they decontextualized data. In addition, TIN members disliked the idea that their insights would be published as findings through a third party, in this case CSIS. The argument was a simple one: why shouldn't government analysts go right to the source? We could not agree more, and we see the final TIN model as one involving direct interaction between government analyst and nongovernmental specialist.⁷

In light of our experience in Singapore, we feel that the data from TIN-2 is relatively incompressible and therefore most accurately conveyed in its original form. Because information from a TIN cannot be neatly packaged, it is important that analysts be involved in future TINs so as to extract useful information. This requires that an analyst have access to all the network's content and takes the time to read it. While this is a time-consuming proposition, the pay-off for an analyst is potentially large.

The second reason that an analyst must be an active part of a TIN to fully leverage its benefits is quite simple. Without having an analyst interacting directly with TIN members, a TIN devolves from a dynamic source of information to a static one. When IC analysts can directly interact with TIN members, they can prompt discussions, request clarifications on particular points, challenge hypotheses to assess their validity, or perform countless other useful tasks.

Perhaps most importantly, having an IC analyst in a TIN would ensure that the discussion remains germane to IC interests and directly assists their ongoing analyses. Current arrangements with nongovernmental specialists result in a certain amount of guesswork over IC priorities and knowledge gaps, thus depriving the government of many potential top-level partners. While the IC is hesitant to disclose its knowledge gaps for good reason, it should do more to balance this

⁷ The current TIN project uses CSIS as the convening organization to test models for outreach and to demonstrate the new knowledge and perspectives that can be brought to bear by nongovernmental experts. As part of our project mandate, CSIS is required to report on the findings to third parties, a function that would not be necessary in an IC/NGO TIN designed for direct interaction between government analysts and outside experts.

concern with the advantages associated with deeper engagement of outside experts, especially on transnational threats.

Conclusion

In this section we have sought to illustrate the many practical ways in which a TIN can help the IC at two distinct phases of the intelligence cycle. Because TIN-2 was run independently of the IC, this section is, to a degree, speculative. Until we run a TIN that includes IC analysts, it is impossible to know the true contribution of such an undertaking.

5

INSIGHTS FROM TIN-2 DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

The following section contains selected responses (in full or as excerpts) to the TIN-2 discussion questions. We have included them to illustrate the breadth and depth of knowledge that a carefully selected group of highly accomplished nongovernmental experts can bring to bear on questions relevant to the IC. Although decontextualizing this content from the wider discussion takes away some value, this is unavoidable without publishing every single TIN post. In an effort to insulate these posts from our own biases and interpretation, we sought to publish them with as few changes as possible. Prior to publication, these edits were sent to TIN members to ensure that our corrections appropriately reflected their initial contributions.

TIN Question 1: Which Groups Concern You and Why?

TIN Question 1 was designed to establish a baseline for which groups and movements were of greatest concern to TIN members at the beginning of the project in February 2008. Each TIN member also wrote a brief “threat assessment” that contains this response and more. All of those assessments are combined in a companion document, with a foreword by Marc Sageman.

TIN Question 2: Fragmentation/Realignment of Extremist Groups

What are the dynamics of realignment among extremist groups in the region? What happens as these groups develop splinters but then re-form into new and different groups?

Sidney Jones—March 15, 2008

Here are a few observations from looking at Darul Islam (DI) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Fragmentation—the emergence of splinter groups, rather than mere indiscipline on the part of one of the organization’s units—can occur as a result of:

- weak leadership (Abu Bakar Ba’asyir had none of the charisma or strictness of Abdullah Sungkar and exerted no control over Mantiqi I)

- access to independent funding (Hambali and the men around him were able to build their non-structural special forces unit because of independent funding obtained from al Qaeda)
- disruption of the organization through widespread arrests, government crackdowns, and/or infiltration (DI in the mid 1980s and JI after 2002)
- availability of alternative ideologies, options for action, or rejection of a no-action stance on the part of the leadership (New splinters emerged in DI after the leaders refused to respond to the deaths of Muslims in Ambon; Noordin gathered new recruits from JI members who got bored with their cell leaders)
- Marginalization of leaders from top positions in a way that causes them to look for roles where they're more appreciated

Realignment can be the mirror image and take place when:

- New funding becomes available
- New leaders emerge
- Disruption of old organizations leaves members in limbo, looking for a new group to join
- Shared prison experience leads to the creation of new bonds
- Shared combat experience in local conflict draws individuals together

I initially thought that the JI wakalah in Poso was an example of fragmentation, and that the 2005 schoolgirl beheadings were an example of one unit going off on its own. But as more information has come out, it is clear it was not a case of a unit breaking off, just of a strong-willed local leader figuring he could call the shots, only to be reprimanded and drawn back into the fold by the leadership, shortly before his arrest.

Sally Neighbour—April 10, 2008

Based on the Australian experience, which in some ways mirrors developments with JI in Southeast Asia, I would suggest the following factors in re-alignment/re-grouping:

- strategic alliances forged between pre-existing groups
- the ability of self-motivated individuals to move between groups (enabled, in part, by these alliances)
- peer pressure in some communities/groups against the use of violence—in some cases for moral reasons; in others for practical considerations such as the likelihood of resulting police/military action—which causes those in favor of violence to shift allegiance, move away from the mainstream and become more secretive

- The perception among some extremists that Salafist/jihadist leaders who do not support/condone violence are “soft,” causing them to coalesce around more militant alternative leaders
- The “relaxed and comfortable” effect (this effect causes certain Salafist/jihadist leaders who are assumed by the authorities to be dangerous because of their rhetoric and associations, to become less inclined toward violence in the places where they live)
- Territorial arguments and “empire building”

The relationship in Australia between the Indonesian-based JI group and the Arab-based Ahlus Sunna wal Jamaah Association (ASJA), led by Sheik Mohammed Omran, is a fascinating and under-studied factor in the jihadist network here. This relationship has been crucial to the development, evolution, and resilience of the jihadist network in Australia. When Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir first came to set up their Australian jemaah in the late 1980s/early 90s, they sought out Sheik Omran, as leader of Australia’s major Salafist group, for his blessing, which he gave. Subsequently, close personal and organizational links were formed, particularly between Omran and Sheik Abdul Salam Zoud in the ASJA camp and Bashir, Sungkar and their Australian emir, Abdul Rahim Ayub. When the JI group failed to take control of a mosque in northern Sydney during a violent power struggle in the late 1990s, they instructed their followers to leave that mosque and instead attend ASJA’s prayer room at Lakemba in western Sydney. This further strengthened the links between the two groups and enabled crucial connections to be made. Examples of such connections include the linkup between JI member and translator Jack Roche, a convert, and ASJA preacher Mohamed Feiz, whose jihadist sermons inspired Roche’s plot to bomb the Israeli embassy in Canberra, for which he served three years in prison.

The connections were further consolidated through inter-marriage, as with JI in Indonesia. For example, Rabiah Hutchinson, the former wife of Australian JI emir Ayub and the so-called “matriarch” of radical Islam in Australia, married her daughter to Khalid Cheiko, a leading member of ASJA. (Cheiko is currently facing trial on terrorism charges in the Pendennis trials, hence his case is sub judice.) The two groups conducted joint paintball training camps and joint hajj trips, which in some cases were combined with military training trips to Pakistan/Afghanistan. These connections strengthened both groups, deepened their pool of talent and expertise, and fortified them against the subsequent police crackdowns.

When the police and the Australian Security Intelligence Agency (ASIO) moved against JI in Australia after the Bali bombings with a series of raids, arrests, and deportations they effectively neutralized the Australian branch. Despite these raids, some of the organization’s members were able to simply shift allegiance to the ASJA related group and continue with their activities. One example is Abdul Rakib Hasan, who was originally

a member of the JI group, but after it was paralyzed, gravitated toward the other group and allegedly became involved in planning terrorist acts (for which he is also currently awaiting trial under Pendennis). The ASJA group itself splintered in the period after the Bali bombings as two small groups of militants, in Sydney and Melbourne, separated themselves from the mainstream Salafist community which they now considered to be too “soft” and insufficiently committed to jihad. They then coalesced around a new leader, Abdul Nacer Benbrika, and became more isolated and secretive in their activities.¹

Omran himself was previously considered to be potentially dangerous because of his jihadist rhetoric and associations with international figures like Abu Qatadah, Abu Dahdah, and Bashir. He is now viewed as sufficiently ensconced in Australia and thought to be disinclined toward attacking his “home”—although it appears the “far enemy” is still fair game. During the Roche plot, the Ayub brothers sought Omran’s advice and he counseled against the operation, opposing it on territorial and not moral grounds.

TIN Question 3: Local versus Global Agendas

One of the major themes that many of you have raised is the dichotomy and convergence between local and global agendas. This topic is too complex to be framed in a single question. We have therefore broken it up into five sub-questions. When posting your response, please address each of these sub-questions to the extent that you can.

1. *What aspects of local jihadism in Southeast Asia are “borrowed” from external sources?*
2. *How is that “borrowing” transmitted across groups?*
3. *What is the role of language, especially facility or lack thereof in Arabic or English in transmitting this “borrowing”?*
4. *What factors cause some local Islamist/jihadist groups to embrace the global al Qaeda–driven agenda while others reject or gravitate away from it?*
5. *Why do certain ideologues rise to the top of the international jihadi pantheon while others don’t?*

Anthony Bubalo—May 10, 2008

The distinction between global and local agenda, at least as far as militant Islamism goes, boils down to how militants define the solution to “the problem.” The interesting thing about classical Islamism as it first emerged in the Middle East and South Asia was that it identified “the West” as part of the problem but the solution both mainstream and

¹ These groups, along with others in Toronto, London, Madrid, and Amsterdam are case studies in the New York City Police Department’s excellent report on “home-grown” extremists, accessed online at: http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf.

militant Islamists prioritized was an internally focused project—i.e., how do we change our own societies to defend against the physical, cultural, and intellectual threats posed by the West. For mainstream Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood it became a question of reform, dawa, and political activism; for the militants it became armed struggle against the apostate rulers of their own states or the barbarism (jahiliya) of their own societies.

As we all know, al Qaedaism re-ordered priorities; the focus they argued needed to be on the West directly, a shift often characterized as a move from the near enemy to the far enemy. The difference in terms of actions was quite stark: militant Islamists in the classical mould fought governments or engaged in sectarian conflicts in their own societies; al Qaedaists targeted the West specifically and largely avoided the former project. It is in this sense that we can distinguish between global and local agenda, including in the Southeast Asian context. So what is “borrowed” is the way that groups like JI and Abu Sayyaf target foreigners—or at least mix them with more locally-focused missions—and justify these operations in the language of global jihad. Thai groups, by contrast, explicitly reject the global agenda and are locally focused. Their approach is much more in line with classical Islamism.

As I noted in my previous post, up-rootedness, or alienation from one’s own society, seems to have been a factor in the decision to adopt a global rather than local agenda elsewhere (i.e., they have no local agenda because for these individuals there is no longer any “local”). This certainly seems to have been a key factor in the Middle East and Iraq. Southern Thailand would seem to fit that reasoning insofar as these Thai groups are firmly rooted in their own communities and societies; they don’t need to go looking for other enemies or agendas.

The curious case is in fact JI; a group that in many ways remained rooted in Indonesian society but nevertheless chose a globalist agenda. Again as I said in my last post, this may be the cause of the group’s internal frictions now, but does not explain why it took the original decision it did. There are others better qualified than I to answer that question, but I suspect there were some specific or peculiar causes, including the strong personal connections formed by JI leaders with al Qaeda through Afghanistan. Now that these connections have been broken, what remains are connections via the virtual umma on the Internet and through the translation and re-publication of jihadist tracts (on which International Crisis Group has recently done an excellent paper).² This in fact gives the translators of this data a lot of power. They get to sort through the great volumes of information that is written and not just select particular authors, but cut and paste together writings that suit their particular agenda. (When Greg Fealy and I were looking

² To view the report, please see International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Publishing Industry*, Asia Report no. 147, February 28, 2008, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5324&l=1>.

at this issue a few years ago it always struck me how the Indonesian versions of Arab jihadist texts often seemed to be compilations of writings—almost like a “best-of” tape.)

I know that there was never a command and control relationship between al Qaeda and JI, but with the decline of the physical connections between these organizations, it makes it very difficult for anyone in JI (e.g., Hambali) to say we should do this because Sheikh Osama said so. What makes this even more the case is that Sheikh Osama does not seem to mention Southeast Asia much anymore in his rare media appearances, nor does his deputy Dr. al-Zawahiri. I wonder too whether the great ferment you see in the jihadisphere over Iraq makes it even harder for the Indonesians to see where they fit in and what to do next. At the very least this means that it is now up to JI—even more so than in the past—to interpret what their next step should be. To some degree the global agenda is pretty uncomplicated—there are not many different ways you can interpret “kill as many westerners as you can.” But because the connection with al Qaeda central is now less direct, and jihadis are arguing on the net about Iraq and what they did right or wrong, it may give JI greater latitude in terms of re-prioritizing toward other, more locally-focused, projects. In short, I wonder whether al-Qaedaism in Southeast Asia is dead?

Christopher “Kit” Collier—May 15, 2008

Anthony’s argument, which resonates with Olivier Roy’s ideas on deterritorialization, stands up just as well for the “curious” case of JI. What I find curious is why so many observers insist on viewing JI as “Indonesian.” Its founding figures were also “uprooted,” during their Soeharto-era exile in Malaysia. The group’s most infamous bombers, Azahari, Top, and Marwan, have been Malaysians—though Marwan is less well known precisely because his attacks have been outside Indonesia. The bombing faction is also closely identified with Hambali and the former Malaysia-based Mantiqi 1. Others more “rooted” in Indonesia may tend to be less enthused by bombings, particularly those targeting “far enemies” or their citizens.

Why, when we are dealing explicitly with transnational terrorists, do we confine ourselves to a narrow nation-state framework? The significance of this struck home for me when a graduate student working on the evolution of Darul Islam into JI asked what I thought the key factors in this transition were. Did he need to look beyond Indonesia for clues? It seems to me that the period of Malaysian exile (hijra) as well as the Afghan experience were critical in the growth of JI’s “global” agenda. We have yet to see how the Mindanao experience—where more Indonesian jihadis have now trained than in Afghanistan—will impact their agenda.

Anthony Bubalo—May 17, 2008

I take Kit’s excellent point here about the transnational or at least trans-regional nature of JI but, correct me if I am wrong, JI still has an Indonesian core and an Indonesian agenda.

This probably explains tensions in recent years between the bombers and other parts of JI as Kit implies.

This makes JI perhaps less curious but certainly still interesting. I am struggling to think of another al Qaeda partisan with as much of a foot in local agendas as in al Qaeda's global ones.

Christopher “Kit” Collier—May 18, 2008

Anthony is right, of course, to note that JI's “core”—i.e. the bulk of its membership—and its leadership are Indonesian. But rightly or wrongly, what interests the outside world about JI are its attacks on foreign targets; the global agenda. Picking up on Anthony's earlier point, I'm interested in the extent to which this is associated with life experience outside Indonesia. Regression analysis would statistically correlate this “independent variable” with the “dependent variable” of involvement with, or leadership of, terror attacks on foreign targets. I say this tongue in cheek, because statistical correlations actually tell us nothing about causal relationships, but this is the kind of “research” that is especially popular in U.S. social science, and I wonder whether it's been done.

The “core” question reminds me of a controversial issue in Iraq coverage a few years back. U.S. assertions that foreign “fighters” were playing a prominent role in “the insurgency” were often dismissed with the point that the overwhelming majority of fighters were Iraqi and the struggle was a nationalist resistance. But the insurgency's main impact was, and continues to be, made through suicide bombings, and these appear to be disproportionately directed and conducted by outsiders. Whatever gains have been made in Iraq since 2006 arise precisely out of division between local nationalists and foreign extremists. So what worries us about JI, or Iraq, has less to do with the “core”—or majority—than the most extreme elements which form the minority.

A good example of a “correlation” argument, which has enjoyed wide currency, is Robert Pape's association of suicide bombing with foreign occupation. Interestingly, the argument falls on its face when applied to Southeast Asia. The only country in the region with Crusader boots on the ground is the Philippines, which has had (so far) exactly zero suicide bombings—although far more civilians have died in IED attacks than in Indonesia. Yet Indonesia, where all the suicide bombs have occurred, has no foreign military presence at all.

Getting back to Anthony's argument about the ideological origins of the global agenda, I'd like to reiterate a point I made at the Sydney meeting. Islamism's modern trajectory—from domestic revolution, to anti-imperialism, and finally (we hope, looking at movements like PKS), cultural reformism—bears uncanny similarities to Marxism. I wonder whether common diagnostic and prognostic forces are at work. When the domestic proletariat failed to rise up against their oppressors, as Marx had predicted, Lenin explained it through a theory of imperialism. The way to accelerate revolutionary

development in the metropole was to support resistance in the colonies, depriving capitalism of its superprofits and intensifying contradictions at home. When this failed as well, Gramsci embellished the canon further by arguing that workers were ideologically mystified, and a cultural struggle had to precede capturing the state. We might learn more about Islamism's local/global dialectic by bearing this history in mind.

Greg Fealy—May 17, 2008

The case of Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia (HTI) makes an interesting study of globalization versus localization. HTI seems to be one of the larger, and more quickly growing, Hizbut Tahrir chapters internationally. HTI doesn't release any figures, but it probably has tens of thousands of members. Having done some research on HTI, my strong impression is that it is precisely the transnational, global aspect of HT which attracts Indonesian Muslims to its ranks. Many of these people are disillusioned with existing mainstream Islamic parties and organizations, believing that they are too given to compromise and "insufficiently Islamic." By contrast, they see the idealistic, almost utopian message of HT as very appealing and it makes them believe they are "more Islamic" than other Muslims. Thus, HT membership is a marker of "total" commitment to an Islamic cause. Not surprisingly, HTI is one of the least indigenized transnational Islamic groups in Indonesia.

Sidney Jones—May 25, 2008

I am glad Greg brought Hizbut Tahrir into the discussion because it is interesting to examine the five Islamic organizations in Indonesia that make a point of their transnational links: HTI, Jemaah Tabligh, the Salafist movement, PKS (as a part of the Muslim Brotherhood network), and JI. In all of them, the sense of participation in a transnational movement has been a key factor in recruitment. Arguably, JI has been the least successful, perhaps because of the internal confusion over identity and goals that have plagued it since 2001–02.

The reason HTI is growing by leaps and bounds is its very tactically astute use of local issues to make the argument for Islamic law. HTI tabloids or op-eds by its members are one-tenth about the caliphate and nine-tenths about Indonesia's socio-economic problems—most recently the oil price hikes—and why Western capitalism is the cause. In Papua, they are focusing on Freeport, trying to beat the pro-independence activists at their own game. Foreigners as the enemy is the subtext of HTI's arguments as much if not more than JI's, and they have organizational skills and political strategy second to none. There is also lots of local funding for HTI. (I don't get the sense that it seeks or receives large infusions from outside, but Greg would know better.)

The internationalism of the nonviolent and apolitical Tablighi movement is a critical component of its appeal, and I suspect more Indonesians have been exposed to South Asia and South Asians through Jemaah Tabligh than through any other means. The

interesting thing is that just as JI long ago learned the value of posing as Tablighis to travel freely to and from Pakistan, now it is Indonesian intelligence using Tablighis as a cover, in Aceh, of all places, and Poso, but also in Thailand.

For Salafis, the strongest links are to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Yemen. It is clear that money is continuing to come in for mosques, schools, and scholarships for studying abroad. While there was a downturn in Saudi funding following September 11, I wonder if we might not see an increase again with the jump in oil prices. While the Salafi-JI relationship on the whole is as fraught as ever, there are at least two people who provide an important bridge. One is Farid Okbah, a senior JI member who apparently controls a large number of scholarships for Salafi study abroad. The other is Ustad Muzayyin, elder brother of KOMPAK financier Aris Munandar, who is in charge of the international relations committee of Dewan Dakwah. For HTI and Jemaah Tabligh, language does not seem to be a critical issue, but Arabic is critical to the spread of Salafism—which may be one reason for its relatively sluggish growth compared to the others. (Internal rifts are another.)

PKS is the only one of the five with a real sense of solidarity with Palestine, through Hamas. But while affiliation with the international Muslim Brotherhood network and an Lc degree in Islamic law were very important for the founding generation of PKS leaders, my guess is that local concerns are far stronger for recruits joining PKS now. Hizbut Tahrir and PKS are competing for the same people—largely drawing them away from Muhammadiyah—and, while PKS has been far more successful, HTI is likely to be able to turn an economic downturn to its advantage.

It is the availability of all these other channels that may be killing al Qaedaism, as per Anthony's post. Some JI members are moving closer to "pure" Salafism and there is some tactical cooperation between HTI and JI in the Solo area, despite repeated trashing of HTI in JI and MMI publications. Another factor is the confusion now reigning over goals and objectives within JI. Almost everyone sees al Qaeda-style bombings to have been counterproductive. They continue to believe in the importance of i'dad (military training) but outside the ongoing trickle to and from the Philippines, it is difficult to know where to get it. The revelations from Abu Husna's interrogation that the same Algerian who tried to get him to Damascus may have succeeded in smuggling Noordin Top out suggests that an al Qaeda network may have a real, not just a virtual presence, in Indonesia.

But even if it does, JI is ideologically mixed up now. The Urwah-Ubaid group may cling to the Noordin approach. Abu Rusdan is apparently going around now telling JI members that it is time to go back to the "old concept" but no one can figure out whether he means back to 1993 and pre-al Qaeda JI or back to Darul Islam. If he is referring to the prior, it is Sungkarism rather than al Qaedaism and we need to understand better how Sungkar internationalized DI. Kit's point about understanding the network of the Indonesians in exile in Malaysia is important here, although by all accounts their focus was still on

Indonesia as the place where the Islamic revolution would begin. In some ways the willingness to experiment with al Qaedaism for some JI leaders ended with the first Bali bombs because such attacks were only desirable if they could ignite that revolution, which they obviously did not (see Ali Imron's account).

TIN Question 4: Foreign Extremist Influence

What is the nature and extent of foreign extremist influence on Southeast Asian groups, actors, and the general population?

1. *Who is being targeted?*
2. *What is being used to reach them (money, literature, Internet, personal contact/missionary activities, student exchanges, training abroad)?*
3. *Which foreign entities are conducting these activities?*
4. *What is the outcome or impact of this influence?*
5. *Where is this trend increasing or decreasing?*

Anthony Bubalo—June 19, 2008

In 2005 Greg Fealy and I did a paper on Middle Eastern Islamist influences in Indonesia.³

I want to qualify what I am about to say by noting that what I will talk about is not just extremist ideas, but a whole gamut of Islamic and Islamist ideas flowing from the Middle East to Southeast Asia. I think the broader context is important.

The paper drew a number of conclusions relevant to Question 4, but before focusing on a couple, let me make a methodological point. Asking “Who is being targeted?” implies more push rather than pull factors in the flow of ideas, money, etc. There is no doubt that there is some predication going on from the activities of Middle Eastern-based Salafist/Wahabist organizations to arguably the Muslim Brotherhood (if you take the claim that PKS is the Indonesian arm of the Brotherhood seriously). But I would argue that the pull factors are in fact stronger and that a variety of organizations—from jihadist groups, Salafists, and Brotherhood-oriented groups to ordinary people interested in becoming “better Muslims”—are looking to the Islamic center for ideas, money, legitimacy, education, training, etc. Moreover, as our paper argued, as much as individuals look to the Middle East for these things, there is almost always a process of indigenization going on. People tend to take what fits or seems appropriate (one exception being the Salafists, who by definition pay more literal attention to what Middle Eastern scholars say). One example that we pointed to in the paper was how amongst

³ The paper is available online at: <http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=229>.

those interested in the Brotherhood's ideas more emphasis was placed on al-Banna than on Qutb.

In general, I have found that Southeast Asia rates pretty low in the Middle East as a priority area for predication. This reflects a traditional chauvinism and parochialism. Of course, charities and international predication organizations like the IIRO and the Muslim World League still operate in Southeast Asia, but their activities in the region are merely a part of their global efforts to spread the faith - or rather their particular version of it. In 2006, while doing some research on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, I raised the topic of Indonesia with some Muslim Brothers and there was generally a very low level of recognition. Nobody I spoke with seemed to know who PKS was, for example. Though, I should qualify this by saying that none of these people would have necessarily been involved in the Brotherhood's international coordination.

The paper also dealt with mechanisms of transmission; all of these will be familiar—connections formed in Afghanistan, students studying in the Middle East, the Internet, publishing and translation, and the role played by charities and institutions in Indonesia. A lot of this has, of course, changed. The Internet and publishing clearly remain important, as Sidney has noted in several of her reports, but personal connections—especially the JI–al Qaeda links—have broken down (or more accurately, have been broken up). Indeed, I wonder what role this has played in the current divisions and ideological debates taking place within JI. I am not in a position to judge, however, whether these changes mean that this foreign influence is decreasing.

There is also a bigger question here of why look to the Middle East? Of course, the answer is obvious; it is seen as the heartland of Islam. Why Southeast Asian Muslims seemed to suddenly start thinking in the 1980s and 1990s that there was something wrong with their Islam and that some dose of reform was needed to bring it closer into line with the Middle Eastern model has me puzzled.

Finally, there are some very interesting things going on in the Middle East right now with respect to both jihadists and mainstream Islamists, and I wonder how this will play out in the region. In terms of the jihadists, we have seen the debates about the targeting of civilians that have erupted in the aftermath of al Qaeda's failures in Iraq. In some ways what is happening to mainstream Islamists is more interesting. Across the region, the typically Muslim Brotherhood movements that have espoused political if not democratic participation are on the back foot, notably in Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, and possibly even in Turkey (if the constitutional court has its way). The result is that in many cases conservatives in these movements are in the ascendant over pragmatists (this is also occurring alongside a growing interest in Salafism and some interesting forays by Salafists—who have typically eschewed politics—into politics in Kuwait and possibly in Yemen). I wonder if this will have an impact on the hitherto positive attitude that most mainstream Islamist parties in Southeast Asia have had toward political and democratic

participation. Here, the Turkish case is potentially very interesting given that it is seen by a number of Islamist parties as an aspirational example. If it is now banned by the Turkish Constitutional court, I wonder if it will change the attitude of Southeast Asian parties to politics. I know from Greg that the PKS has, at the very least, been following events in Turkey very closely.

Joseph Liow—June 22, 2008

While the theme of transnational influences automatically brings to mind networks such as al Qaeda and JI, transnational influences have been a major and complex facet of Muslim life in Southeast Asia for centuries. Hence, while these contemporary expressions are important, it is vital to contextualize them in historical terms, and to gain a better understanding of how they relate to the diverse range of transnational currents in the region today. An interesting question is how mainstream mass-movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood have influenced politics and conflict dynamics in the region and at which times (after all, the Brotherhood itself went through several permutations). Another curious question is how these movements intersect with radical groups today. The Brotherhood's ideas first found their way into the region through PAS in Malaysia and now are driving PKS in Indonesia. Not surprisingly, these two political parties have also been subjected to intense scrutiny, especially by the West, because of their roots and their alternative visions of governance (although to what extent they are really alternatives can of course be debated).

A major conduit of transnational influence has been scholarly exchange between the region and the Middle East, as well as South Asia. These networks have long been an important vehicle through which theological currents and ideas from the Arab world and South Asia have been transplanted to Southeast Asia. Another important vehicle of late has been the Internet and satellite television. These have been critical in fostering awareness, especially on the part of the younger generation, of the issues and challenges faced by Muslims in other parts of the world. This in turn generates a reinvigorated sense of the ummah's identity and, at the same time, adds greater meaning to their own plight at home.

TIN Question 5: Criminal Activity by Extremist Groups

Which extremist groups engage in serious criminal activity to support their activities?

- 1. What types of criminal activities are extremist groups involved in?*
- 2. Do extremist groups and organized crime groups interact? If so, what is the extent and nature of that interaction?*
- 3. How do religiously motivated extremist groups justify any criminal activity?*

4. *Does law enforcement share anti-crime lessons with other members of the counter-terrorism community?*

Please offer your own questions and content as you see fit.

Joseph Liow—September 19, 2008

The nexus between criminal activity and the insurgency in Thailand is a murky one—everyone knows it is there but exact and detailed information is still lacking on how exactly this nexus plays out. I certainly agree that the politicians and field commanders calling the shots in the south are involved. Fiefdoms have been created that those inclined toward reconciliation have found immensely difficult to penetrate. Given the political inertia in Bangkok today, it is more likely than not that these fiefdoms are going to be expanded and deepened in the south. Further to that, many violent instances, even those described in some media as “indiscriminate,” are calculated events in the context of turf wars between these major players. As is the case in the southern Philippines, the political economy of violence in southern Thailand is an important but severely under-studied phenomenon.

While Paisal Due-ramae⁴ is an example of the “high-end” of the political economy, we also need to note that the insurgency is not only about high politics but, in many instances, is also a village-based, local phenomenon as well. In this respect, it is also sustained by small businesses such as co-ops, tea shops, grocery stores, among others, and donations from local villagers. This dimension is separate from the wider reach that drug trafficking networks afford, though there are still some links. In fact, there is evidence of dissonance within the insurgent “movement.” Village-based insurgents are aware that big-money interests are trying to draw some of their localized support away from their orbit, which they do not support and view as undermining the struggle in the long term.

Also, while I agree that the BRN-C definitely has a tactical aspect that can be termed a “reign of fear,” I’m not sure if it is the driving factor in how locals are kept in line. Persuasion is an equally popular motivational tool in the south. I think this gets to a larger issue, which is how coherent the insurgency is and how influential the BRN-C is in terms of the tactical, day-to-day management of the conflict. I am not too certain that it is an altogether coherent “movement” we are dealing with. Intimidation sits with persuasion; high politics sits with local agendas; big money sits with co-ops.

The question of drug traffickers joining the insurgency as redemption for their sins brings us to the larger issue of the religious nature to the conflict. Here, I think it is only a matter of degrees. Few would argue that there is absolutely no religion involved. Nevertheless, that tells us very little and does not get us close to a proper understanding of the conflict, as far as I am concerned. Just as drug traffickers join the insurgency to redeem themselves,

⁴ See page 14 for further information on Paisal Due-ramae.

Tabligh members have told me that they joined the Tabligh to redeem themselves from the sins of killing during their participation in the insurgency. Again, how convoluted a picture we have! Nevertheless, I personally think we need to approach the religion issue with a bit of a critical eye. The government (indeed, many governments) takes the position that these insurgents follow the “wrong” Islam. That being the case, when people join the insurgency to redeem themselves of sin, the government can and has taken this as further justification of their position. Playing this up however, distracts us from some of the fundamental issues involved, which may NOT be about religion at all! Attempting to discredit the insurgency in one fell swoop by saying they are all “misguided” and following the “wrong” Islam is to caricature the causes of a problem that in reality run much deeper than what a Malay-Muslim man or woman thinks religion is trying to tell him/her. The religion certainly resonates, but it is not and cannot be the be-all and end-all, certainly not in the specific case of southern Thailand.

Sally Neighbour—July 26, 2008

The Salafi/jihadi community in Sydney provides an interesting case study of the crossover between terrorist and criminal activity. The Lebanese Muslim community concentrated in southwestern Sydney has for many years hosted a very active organized criminal network principally involved in drug and weapons trafficking. Australian police have yet to fathom precisely why this is. They assume one cause is the relative socio-economic disadvantage and sense of alienation among this community, which is the closest thing Australia has to a “Londonistan”-type phenomenon. Interestingly, the problem is largely confined to the Lebanese Muslim community and does not extend to the equally large Lebanese Christian community. There has been ongoing violence between rival criminal families, the chief of which is the Darwiches, with a series of murders and assaults.

In recent years there have been growing links between the criminal group(s) and the extreme Islamist group(s) in the area. Case in point is an individual named Saleh Jamal, a former street thug and drug dealer turned fundamentalist Muslim. Jamal was convicted of terrorism related offences in Lebanon but was acquitted on appeal, if my memory serves me correctly. He was subsequently deported to Australia to face charges, including those related to a drive-by shooting of the Lakemba police station, which he allegedly carried out with a leading member of one of the top criminal families. Jamal is also accused of having surveilled various sites in Sydney as terrorist bombing targets in conjunction with members of the alleged terrorist group currently facing trial in the Pendennis case. He would probably have been arrested with them had he not been in Lebanon at the time.

The plot thickens with the theft of a dozen rocket-launchers from an Australian army depot in Sydney, the subject of an ongoing major investigation. So far only one (or possibly two) of the rocket launchers has been found. It was sold to a member of an outlaw motorcycle gang, then to the Darwiches (one of the criminal families), and finally

to a member of the Pendennis terrorist group. The others still have not been found, to the great alarm of the authorities.

The New South Wales Police Middle Eastern Organized Crime Squad, which finds itself working increasingly closely with the counterterrorism command, reports increasing religious observance among previously non-religious criminal groups and individuals. It also reports a growing trend among these criminals of justifying their acts by asserting that they are not bound by “kafr” laws. This has also manifested in a marked trend toward Islamic conversion among prisoners in jails such as the “Super Max” high-security prison in Sydney, which has been nick-named “Super Mosque” for the large number of inmates who have converted. In the past this trend has also been reported among indigenous/Aboriginal prisoners, although they generally lapsed after their release. I am guessing the phenomenon will prove more enduring among those of Middle Eastern backgrounds.

Sidney Jones—August 13, 2008

Indonesian jihadis have many intersections with ordinary criminal activity, in addition to the fa’i that Haniff describes. These include recruitment of criminals in prisons, which is as often at the initiative of the criminal as the jihadi; recruitment of thugs/gang members in conflict areas; use of transnational gun mafias; and false document fixers. “Computer jihad,” involving credit card fraud and the destruction of computer systems through hacking, is widely discussed and encouraged, but there do not appear to have been very many instances of it, in part because the computer skills of Indonesian jihadis, with a few exceptions, are not high.

In prisons, the relationship between jihadis and criminals is complex. In some cases, jihadis are seen as having higher status or get better donations of food and other extras, and therefore criminals have an incentive to join their religious study groups. Jihadis, for their part, are eager to have allies within the prison system in battles with other gangs. They also tell criminals that one way of atoning for their past sins is to wage jihad. Some criminals admire the jihadis for what they see as an incredibly brave struggle and incredibly pure devotion to faith. What happens after release is much less known. We know of one criminal recruit who is now a teacher in a JI school, but what happens to the others is a mystery. What we do know is that no one in the Indonesian apparatus has any interest in trying to find out who the criminal recruits are or what they do after they are freed.

In Ambon and Poso, JI and KOMPAK both recruited local gang members, on the assumption that these were youths who were used to violence and would make better mujahideen in combat situations. Again, they offered participation as a way of atonement for past misdeeds.

We do not know too much about the small arms market but, at least in Poso, some of the weapons obtained were through a criminal gun mafia based in Mindanao that brought disassembled arms in to the west coast of Sulawesi.

Jihadis routinely use false travel documents and ID cards. The most interesting case involves the two Indonesian JI leaders who were arrested in Malaysia carrying passports stolen from Indonesian businessmen in London in 2003 and 2005. The Indonesians were given the passports by a North African in Jakarta. At the very least, this suggests some intersection between jihadis and international document theft.

As far as we know, there is no connection between JI and the Chinese-dominated drug trafficking rings in Indonesia or with human traffickers, although when jihadis move back and forth between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, they may make occasional use of the same boatmen used by undocumented migrants. Even there, though, security concerns have made it preferable for them to retain their own transport network.

The Indonesian counterterrorism unit is well integrated with the transnational crime section. A star counterterrorism investigator now heads the local Interpol office, and the provincial police chief who got high marks for his handling of terrorism in Poso now heads the transnational crime directorate in Jakarta. Gories Mere, the criminal investigation head who oversaw the establishment of the counterterrorism unit, now heads the anti-narcotics agency.

TIN Question 6: Conditions and Triggers Leading to Radicalization and Violence

How do individuals and groups come to understand or frame their grievances (e.g., as a “Western War against Islam” or “Indigenous Regime against Islam”)?

- 1. What experiences, circumstances, or sense of moral outrage contribute most to the radicalization process?*
- 2. What triggers lead people (whom you have studied) to turn violent in defense of Islam or to attain other goals?*
- 3. How do terrorist networks form and how do they help mobilize people for violence?*
- 4. What role do individual leaders/preachers play in generating the conceptual frame and mobilizing people for violence?*

Waleed Aly—August 20, 2008

I am not an empiricist, so my responses to this question are going to be skewed toward theory. But perhaps that might be useful in framing some more empirical responses whereby people could say whether or not the theory plays out in the conflicts they study.

Often, in trying to understand the processes and dynamics of radicalisation, we forget that there are, in the broadest terms, two very distinct stages to consider. That is, the processes that bring a person to the point of radicalisation and frustration—and to forming groups with others who feel similarly—are often very different than the processes that drive an individual to commit violent action as part of that group.

Accordingly, the relevant “experiences, circumstances, or sense of moral outrage” may differ wildly from one individual to another. For some it might be experiences of economic deprivation - though I think this is an overstated factor. For others it might be senses of social exclusion. What seems to be a necessary pre-requisite, though, is some feeling of alienation. That is, there must be something that calls into question that person’s sense of belonging in society. In some circumstances, the alienating dynamics will be palpably obvious—southern Thailand and the southern Philippines may be examples of this. In others, the alienation process might be less obvious. But experiences of racism or other forms of cultural experience are likely to be important foundations here. That seems to be a fairly common experience in the United Kingdom, for example.

At this point, it is important to note that although the experiences in question may be individual, political identity is very often collective. Political action is invariably so. Terrorism exemplifies this very well. It is overwhelmingly a group activity—with only very rare exceptions. It is almost always conducted on behalf of some collective—often without that collective’s consent. Accordingly, we can begin to suspect that the most relevant experiences or moral outrages will be those that are felt in collectivist terms. That is, experiences of alienation that proceed from some kind of collective identity. Of course that is not a blanket rule. It is entirely possible that a person begins to feel alienated on individual terms but finds their sense of belonging in collectivist terms. We can probably surmise, however, that collective alienation will be the most potent.

The American psychologist, Fathali Moghaddam, describes this as “fraternal deprivation,” and I think it is a useful concept. That concept holds that individual failure or deprivation is not necessarily central, but some kind of claimed community or fraternity is. Hence what is, in my view, the common red herring of pointing out that many terrorists are middle class and materially well to do. That misses the collective or fraternal dimension of their grievance.

That brings us to the question of framing. It is one thing to have grievances or to feel alienated. Indeed, many people feel this way at some point in their lives, if not all of us. But in order for this to be politically activated, it requires those grievances to be framed to include an enemy. That is a matter of narrative. And it is here, I suspect, that preachers and other sources of information and analysis become important. The genius of symbolic terrorism figureheads, like bin Laden, is that they provide this frame in compelling terms. They provide the aggrieved with a story to explain their subjugation. They do not appeal to and radicalize those without qualms. Rather, they give existing grievances sharper and

deeper expression. This sort of narrative building is familiar. In the 20th century, figures like Sayyid Qutb provided it by constructing the Egyptian state, in its novel state of jahiliyyah, as the institutional enemy. Accordingly, the frame was the believing subject against the apostate ruler. The shift from this nationally-focused activism to al Qaeda's global terrorism was ultimately one of framing. Bin Laden was able to convince certain people that the apostate rulers of Muslim lands were symptomatic of something systemically oppressive that was ultimately controlled by the "far enemy," quintessentially embodied in the United States. That is, the frame was no longer local and contained by the nation state. Instead, it became a global frame that engulfed multiple societies separated by vast differences but unified in their experiences of subjugation. Bin Laden's contribution was to find a common story to link these disparate experiences.

Today, such narratives can be provided by innumerable, diverse sources. These include local preachers but also virtual and sometimes faceless ones that operate via cyberspace and the global media. In this decentralized way, narratives can be self-constructed to some degree.

It is important to note that this framing has to be compelling to the audience. That is, it has to resonate with the audience's experiences. Accordingly, there is a symbiotic relationship at play. Experience encourages framing and framing trades on experience. To return to bin Laden, he asserts that his own hatred of the United States stemmed from observing its actions in support of Israel in Lebanon in the 1980s. Without this experience, it is less likely that he would have developed his global frame. Similarly, a person born and raised in the West is unlikely to find an anti-Western global framing compelling unless he or she has a reservoir of alienating experiences from which to draw upon that can be explained in these cultural terms. In long-standing conflicts, of course, this is much easier. An analytical frame is already in place, the enemy is clearly identified, and a political culture grows around it. In this case, it is not so much a question of a preacher being responsible, but rather a communally shared narrative. Society, if you like, is the preacher.

The narrative frame, of course, implies some kind of group identity. And the transition from radicalization to violent activism really begins in earnest at the point of group formation. If the individual can find people for whom the narrative in question resonates equally, the circumstances are ripe for the creation of a new community defined by shared feelings of alienation and exclusion. The formation of this group is what allows the potential escalation to violence. Such escalation is unlikely for an individual, but the dynamics of group psychology allow for it. One way this escalation might play out is that each member of the group seeks to "outbid" each other in an attempt to prove their credentials to the other members of the group. In any event, the new "community" makes the narrative self-reinforcing since it is precisely this narrative that makes them cohere and forms the reason for their social existence. From this point, information is simply assimilated into the narrative in such a way that confirms it.

But escalation is not automatic. Many social groupings formed around grievance and alienation do not matriculate into violence, or even serious anti-social behavior. Moghaddam explains the escalation process by using the analogy of a narrowing staircase. At the bottom floor gather all those who are aggrieved. People only move to the next stage when they seek solutions to their predicament and cannot see any adequate options presented to them. The more options for dealing with grievances are perceived to be limited, the more likely a person—as a member of a group—is going to begin morally engaging with the option of resorting to violence. Violence is not an immediate response. Humans have strong psychological barriers that prevent them from taking the lives of other people. It is a difficult thing to dislodge these natural restraints, and so political activism very rarely takes a violent form. It is far more likely that violence occurs when the person in question feels that every other option has either been exhausted or is futile.

In the context of homegrown radicalization in the West, exhausted or futile options might include failed attempts to change government policy through protest or lobbying or unsuccessful efforts to resist perceived attacks on cultural identity. In conflict zones exhausted or futile options are more likely to proceed from failed negotiations or a perception that the activism of previous generations has failed and something new is needed. I recently attended a seminar at Monash University by a PhD candidate who had just returned from her fieldwork in southern Thailand. She noted how the ideological currents driving the insurgency there had become more radically Islamist among the younger generation, whereas the older generation had adopted more of a cultural and nationalist worldview. This had led to the increased popularity of violent tactics, like beheadings. Part of what was driving this shift was a perception that the older generation had failed because they were too restrained. In Moghaddam's terms, this would mean that another option had been exhausted.

Accordingly, it is perhaps a little ambiguous to think of violence being “triggered” by specific events. Radicalization, and then the matriculation to violence, are complex social, political, and especially psychological processes that can be years in the making. They are not necessarily triggered by a single specific event.

I would be interested to hear if this sort of framework fits what people have found in their fieldwork. For those of you who are interested in reading Moghaddam's article, it is from *American Psychologist* (Volume 60(2), 2005, 161–169).

Greg Fealy—August 26, 2008

I wanted to comment on the issue of grievances. By far the most frequently cited source of grievance from JI terrorists is that of “infidel” violence against the Muslim community across the globe. It is this topic which draws out the most emotive language in texts written by JI members. It is also the starting point for the chains of logic that they assembled to justify bombings against “ordinary civilians.” A good example of this kind of thinking is the Istimata Declaration which seems to have been largely crafted by Imam

Samudra and appeared on a website in October 2002, about the time the first Bali bombings took place. I have attached a copy of this below.

International Martyrs' Battalion International Martyrs' Battalion (2002)

"Istimata Declaration" (in English)⁵

"Let it be known that every single drop of Muslim blood, be it from any nationality and from any place will be remembered and accounted for. Thousands of Muslims have perished, notably in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kashmir, Gujarat and in various places on the Asian continent. Elsewhere in Europe, Muslims were mercilessly persecuted in Bosnia and Kosovo. While in Africa, Muslims were brutally killed in the Sudan. The heinous crime and international conspiracy of the Christians also extends to the Philippines and Indonesia. This has resulted in 'Muslim cleansing' in Moro [southern Philippines], Poso, Ambon and surrounding areas [in Indonesia]. It is clearly evident the Crusade is continuing and will not stop. ...

The attack on the Islamic State of Afghanistan by the International Christian community and its allies (Allied Force), under the leadership of Bush (may curse of Allah be upon him), will not be forgotten. Bush himself, acknowledged that the so-called war of 'Undefinite Justice' [sic] is really a Crusade. Every blow will be repaid. Blood will be redeemed by blood. A life for a life.

'International Justice', Democratic Values and the efforts as well as the rulings of the United Nations are just empty promises. The Muslim community has never benefited nor received any justice from the Toghut [evil rulers].

'... And fight the infidels as a single entity, as they fight you (Muslims) in total ...'
(At-taubah: 36).

One Muslim to another is like a single body. If one part is in pain, the other part will also feel the pain.

To all you Christian infidels! If you define this act [i.e., the Bali bombings] on your civilians as heinous and cruel, you yourself have committed crimes which are more heinous. What about the 600 thousand babies in Iraq and half a million children in Afghanistan including their mothers who are treated as combatants? They are assumed to be at fault and consequently should bear the brunt of thousands of your bombs????!!!

Where is your rationality and your conscience????!!!

⁵ Accessed December 12, 2002, online at: <http://www.istimata.com/nyata/htm>.

The cries of the babies and Muslim women as well as the diplomatic efforts of a small number of Muslims has never succeeded in stopping your brutality and it will never succeed.

Well, here we are the Muslimin [Muslims]!!!

Well, here we are, as blood relatives of those who have died as a result of your aggression.

Well, here we are, the Muslimin!!!

Our hearts are in pain and we will harness the pain of the death of our brothers and sisters. We will never let your cruelty on our brothers go unpunished. You will bear the consequences of your actions wherever you are.....

We are responsible for the incident in Legian St, Kuta, Bali at Saturday Night, October 12, 02, also near U.S. General Consulate building in Jalan Hayam Wuruk 188, Denpasar, Bali at the same night.

Our demands are as follows:

1. You will not feel safe from our attacks as long as the Jews and the Christians remain in Masjidil Haram, Masjidil Nabawi and Masjidil Aqsa
2. People from your countries will experience death, wherever they are, as long as the Allied Force (International Christians and their friends: America, England, Germany, Australia, France, Canada, Netherlands, Italy, Japan, China, India, Sweden and others) do not leave Afghanistan.
3. The civilians of your countries will receive the above treatment, as long as our brothers, who you classify as terrorists, remain as prisoners and are tortured in prison, especially at Guantanamo.
4. With special reference to Indonesian citizens working at BIN under the armpits of CIA. If you are a Muslim, seek forgiveness from Allah. Find another job that does not contribute to the sufferings and cause harm to the Muslimin. If you persist in helping the American infidels spy upon the Muslims and spread lies in the Muslim community, we will have no hesitation in treating you in the same manner as your infidel masters, the American colonials and world terrorist.”

Kuta, 12-10-02

Katibatul Istimata al-Alamiyah

(International Martyrs' Battalion)

Kumar Ramakrishna—September 10, 2008

How do individuals and groups come to understand or frame their grievances (e.g., as a “Western War against Islam” or “Indigenous Regime against Islam”)?

The role of an “ideological entrepreneur”—i.e., individual leader/preacher—is key to understanding the process by which individual grievances come to be regarded as part of a wider “Western War against Islam,” for instance. These ideological entrepreneurs generate the “conceptual frame” by which disaffected individuals come to interpret their personal difficulties as inextricably linked to a wider conflict. The ideological entrepreneur does so by doing three things. First, they diagnose the problem—e.g., you are a “second class” citizen in your own country. Second, they identify the cause of the problem or the “scapegoat”—e.g., you are in this situation because of the apostate regime that marginalizes Muslims is a stooge of the West. Third, they identify the solution—e.g. armed jihad to overthrow the apostate regime and set up an Islamic State in which social justice will prevail and your personal difficulties will be resolved. I would be very keen to hear if such a three-part explanatory framework of how ideological entrepreneurship operates makes sense to others, empirically speaking.

When I say “personal difficulties” above, I refer to an almost limitless set of what Jonathan Drummond calls “delegitimizing discoveries.” These could cause individuals to lose faith in—or feel a sense of deep “moral outrage” at—a prevailing social order. Such “delegitimizing discoveries” could be variously political, socio-economic, or cultural. If we accept that in religious radicalization, identity issues are central and reside at the core of what may seem to be political, socio-economic and cultural grievances on the surface, then we may want to consider the argument of Vamik Volkan and the social identity theorists that one’s personal identity is inextricably tied up with one’s “Group Tent” or Collective Self. Hence, attacks against a sacred symbol of the Collective Self, such as the Babri Mosque or the Amritsar Temple, or insults against the Founder of the Faith, would be regarded an attack on one’s individual dignity, moving one to consider—largely as a reflex and unconsciously—violent responses.

Actually, I wonder if we could “unpack” a little what we mean by “turning violent” in defense of Islam. I suppose this should be split into two parts. The first part is being moved to join a violent movement. The second is actually physically harming the enemies of the faith. There are those who might play some non-violent role in a chain of activities that lead to a violent act. These would far outnumber the few who would engage in direct violence or take the ultimate step of self-immolation through a suicide attack. If we accept this two-part schema then perhaps there is a hierarchy of “triggers” leading to the violent act that needs to be isolated and teased apart.

Giora Eliraz—September 1, 2008

How do individuals and groups come to understand or frame their grievances (e.g., as a “Western War against Islam” or “Indigenous Regime against Islam”)?

Since I do not know about any books and articles that focus on the issue of how radical Muslims frame their grievances into phrases, I dove into relevant Arabic, English, and Malay texts. I was not surprised to learn that this issue of framing grievances appears

almost to be as broad as an ocean. I am going to share with you some drops from this ocean. I am now considering the possibility of using this analysis as a basis for a broader paper about the phrasing of grievances in Islamic radical discourse. I also wish to examine the possibility of writing a joint paper with one or two members of the group on the incorporation of global radical terminology, motives, images, and association into radical Islamic discourse in the Malay-Indonesian world. Such a paper could also study etymological issues by tracing the transmission of words and phrases from the Arabic discourse into the Malay discourse.

Before I begin, I wish to turn your attention to two articles that deny a connection between grievances and terror in the context of Islamic radicalism:

- Colin Rubenstein, “What is really irking the radical Islamists,” *The Age*, July 14, 2005.⁶
- Melvin E. Lee, “The Fallacy of Grievance-based Terrorism,” *Middle East Quarterly*, vol. XV, no.1 (Winter 2008), pp. 71-79.⁷

Following are my preliminary, observations and insights:

A. Phrases that include two main elements. The first element is “the accused.” Common examples of the accused are the West (al-Gharb, الغرب); America, Israel, the Jewish people, or Zionists. The second element is the “denounced” action or phenomenon. These include dominance/rule (saitara, سيطرة); hegemony (haimana, هيمنة); invasion (ghazu, غزو); cultural invasion (al-ghazu al-thaqafi, الغزو الثقافي); intellectual invasion (al-ghazu al-fikri, الغزو الفكري); occupation (ihtilal, احتلال); hostility/enmity (‘adawa, عداوة/’udwan, عدوان). These two elements appear in different word combination and in varying contexts (historically, politically, etc.). The following are some examples: the Western dominance (السيطرة الغربية); the Western hegemony in the world (الهيمنة الغربية في العالم); Western hegemony on Muslim thought; Western hegemony in world politics; the Western intellectual invasion of the Islamic countries; American hegemony in the world; the Jewish hegemony; Zionist hegemony; Israeli hegemony in the Middle East; the Western occupation of Afghanistan; the American occupation of Iraq; Israeli occupation of Palestine; American political, economic, and cultural occupation; Western cultural occupation; American hostility toward Iran; and Israeli hostility toward the Palestinians. Sometimes two or even three of the accused appear together. This is the case in the U.S. and Western hegemony in world politics; U.S.-Israeli hegemony; Jewish-American hegemony; and the Jewish-Zionist-American lobby.

⁶ Available online at: <http://www.theage.com.au/news/opinion/what-is-really-irking-the-radical-islamists/2005/07/13/1120934299264.htm>.

⁷ Available online at: [online http://www.meforum.org/article/1830](http://www.meforum.org/article/1830).

B. Phrases that include conspiracy (mu'amara, مؤامرة). There are a variety of combinations, such as the conspiracy against Muslims and Islam; the Jewish conspiracy; Jewish-Christian conspiracy against Islam; Crusader-Jewish-Hindu conspiracy against Islam; Jewish-Zionist-American conspiracy; American conspiracy against Islam; and the Zionist-American conspiracy.

C. Phrases that include the Arabic term for false god or idol (taghut, طاغوت), which can also be interpreted as “tyranny;” and the word for tyrant (taghiya, طاغية). In contrast to the above-mentioned phrases that are directed primarily toward the “far enemy,” phrases that include the words taghut or taghiya are often directed toward the “near enemy” of “apostate regimes” in the Muslim world. Examples include the tyrant regimes; the Western backing of tyrant regimes; the rule of the false gods/tyranny (hukm al-Taghut); and American Taghut. Sometimes enemies are denounced as those who worship “false idols.”

D. Phrases that express the sin of polytheism and idolatry (shirk, شرك); or similarly describe one as polytheist, pagan, or an idolater (mushrk, مشرك). Often expressed in the plural mushrikun, mushrk is derived from the same Arabic root as shirk. Examples of these phrases include the Zionist-Crusader-Polytheist conspiracy and the danger of polytheism.

E. Phrases that include the Islamic concept of godless ignorance (al-jahiliyya, الجاهلية) and its re-actualization in the concept of a “new jahiliyya,” which is strongly connected to Sayyid Qutb (1906-66) and Abul-A'la al-Mawdudi (1903-79). In its original understanding, jahiliyya referred to the ignorance and godlessness that prevailed in pre-Islamic Arabia. The concept of “new jahiliyya” targets modernity and Western societies that are alleged to reject the divinity of God and God’s sovereignty. This definition also epitomizes—in the radical fundamentalist view—the combination of godlessness, barbarism, decadence, and ignorance prevailing in modern impious societies, conditions similar to those within pre-Islamic Arabia. Muslim societies experiencing the process of Westernization are warned by radical Muslims that they risk being infected by the evils of the “new jahiliyya.” Examples of such phrases appearing in radical Islamic discourse include: the jahili systems; the jahili society; the jahili influences on the lives of Muslims; the jahili world; the jahili America; the struggle between jahili society and Islam. So, grievances expressed by radical Muslims also reveal critical views about their own Muslim society, nourished, among other things, by an alleged weakening of religious belief and a deterioration of moral behavior through the process of Westernization and secularization. Such criticism constitutes one of the formative elements of contemporary intellectual thought in the Islamic world.

F. Phrases that include the Arabic word for infidelity and unbelief (kufur, كفر), or unbeliever and infidel (kafir, كافر/plural kuffar, كفار). Certain regimes in the Arab Middle East are denounced as infidel regimes—for example, the infidel regime in Baghdad. This

denunciation, however, is not limited to the Middle East or to the Muslim world. Other examples include the infidel regime of Uzbekistan, as well as the infidel West (الغرب الكافر), the infidel America, and the infidel Israel.

Many Arabic terms, not to mention terms that are deeply anchored in the Islamic tradition, have been borrowed by the Malay language. It is no wonder that many terms which are salient in radical Islamic discourse and originated in the Middle East have found their way to Southeast Asia. Notable examples include ghazu, jahiliyya, jahili, kufur, kafir, taghut, hukum al-taghut, sistem taghut, kufurkan hukum taghut (the atheism of the rule of tyranny/false idols), sistem taghut yang zalim (the tyrannical system of the false idols), and shirk. These terms and phrases appear in both the broader context (i.e. historically, geographically, culturally, etc.) and in the contemporary local context. Since radical Muslims in Southeast Asia seem to be very attentive to radical discourse from the “center” of the Muslim world, radical Muslims in Southeast Asia also use phrases such as: invasi Barat dalam pemikiran Islam (the Western invasion of Islamic thought); hegemoni Kristen (the Christian hegemony); invasi budaya sekularisasi (the invasion of the culture of secularism); pendudukan al-Quds dan al-Aqsa (the occupation of Jerusalem and al-Aqsa); pendudukan U.S. di Afganistan (the U.S. occupation in Afghanistan); pendudukan israel di palestine (the Israeli occupation in Palestine); konspirasi salibis (the conspiracy of the crusaders); and zaman jahiliya baru (the period of the new-jahiliyya). Naturally the radical discourse of the Middle Eastern “center” imprints itself on the way that radical Muslims in Southeast Asia phrase their own distinct grievances, combining their own grievances with those borrowed from universal radical Islamic thought. Examples of this include the phrase konspirasi Islam Liberal (the conspiracy of liberal Islam), which appeared in Indonesia, or rejim sekular/taghut malaysia, UMNO, which was used in Malaysia. During the violent conflict in Maluku, proyek Kristenisasi Salib (the Christianization Crusade Project) and Konspirasi Zionis-Yahudi (the Zionist-Jewish conspiracy) were used by radical Islamists. The latter phrase, essentially alien to the Indonesian context, was imported into this local conflict in the “remote periphery” of Islam from radical discourse that emerged in the “center” of the Muslim world.

Sally Neighbour—October 11, 2008

A lot of my recent work has been about individuals who have become intimately involved in the “global jihad” and who, to me, make fascinating case studies into the personal triggers that prompt individuals to become radicalized. A great deal has been written about the importance of group dynamics and influential leaders. However, I am particularly interested in the personal dynamics—i.e., the specific and individual factors—that draw people to radical Islam. The individuals I have studied in depth, and have come to know quite well by spending extensive time with, are all Australian converts. They include Jack Roche, who was sentenced to nine years in jail for conspiring to blow up the Israeli embassy, a plot inspired and directed by “al Qaeda central” in

Afghanistan; Jack Thomas, who is currently facing trial in Melbourne, charged with receiving funds from al Qaeda (regrettably as a result of admissions he made to me in a television interview in 2006); and Rabiah Hutchinson, an Australian Muslim woman who was intimately involved with JI in Indonesia in the 1980s, Sayyaf's Al-Ittehad in Peshawar in the 1990s, and al Qaeda and the Taliban in 2000/1, and about whom I am currently writing a book.⁸

All of these people (and others I have studied) share certain qualities—and they are not all negative qualities by any means. On the contrary, their positive qualities are quite compelling. Importantly, the motivations that propelled them toward the “global jihad” are not necessarily negative either. In a sense they are all mavericks rather than typical, conservative, law-abiding citizens. They are free-thinkers, risk-takers, and non-conformists. Of the trio, Jack Roche is the most “negative” in his motivations—i.e., he best fits the conventional view of the radical convert. He was a loner and a rebel. His mother died early and his father was an authoritarian army man who re-married, travelled constantly, and never provided his son with a settled family life. Young Jack rebelled, left his family, travelled constantly himself, and never really settled down. He was repeatedly married and divorced, became an alcoholic, and—mired in a midlife crisis—found Islam. This is a typical radical convert story; a dysfunctional, unhappy loner finds meaning, security, respect, community, and a wife in Islam. His anger and resentment toward the world made him susceptible to radicalization and violence.

Jack Thomas, however, is a very different story. Thomas came from a happy, loving, supportive family, and had a stable, comfortable childhood. In no way was he alienated or excluded from society. He too was a maverick of sorts, in the sense that he was on a quest for meaning and a mission in life. He tried Buddhism, skydiving, and Zoroastrianism. He finally settled on Islam. Thomas's journey was very much a “boys own adventure” and he was attracted to Islam by its social justice and egalitarianism. As a young man with a strong sense of social and natural justice, he was drawn to the most positive elements of the faith. His youthful passion and sense of adventure meant that it was then not a huge leap for him to make the decision that he was willing to “fight for his oppressed Muslim brothers and sisters.” It was a romantic ideal—much like it was for David Hicks and any number of other Western converts and born-again Muslims. There was no doubt in his mind that fighting the Americans in Afghanistan put him on the side of the good guys.

Rabiah is a mixture of the two.

All these individuals are self-selected and gravitated toward groups or leaders who shared their views and goals and/or were able to facilitate their actions. My point is simply that I

⁸ This book, titled *The Mother of Mohammed*, will be published by Melbourne University Publishing in May 2009.

think it is important to remember that personal triggers are as important as group dynamics or an influential leader in an individual's radicalization. And not all jihadists/terrorists are alienated or angry. For some the attraction is entirely positive.

Najib Azca—October 13, 2008

Provoked by Sally's comments on personal dynamics of some jihadists, I want to share some stories that I collected during my fieldwork. I distinguish those who joined in radical activism into three kind of trajectories based on the nature of their engagement with family. These trajectories include family-linked, family-turned, and family-shifted activists.

Family-linked activists are those who became radical activists as part of a continuation of their family links. The story of Amrozy and Muchlas, a.k.a. Ali Ghufron, two brothers from Tenggulun, Lamongan, is a striking example. Another compelling story was that of Farihin, a.k.a. Ibnu Yasir, who fought in Afghanistan and joined JI due to his father's link to the DI/TII movements. He was accused of being involved in the bombing of the Australian Embassy in Kuningan but freed from verdict. He was also sent to jail twice for his role in the communal violence in Poso.

Noor Huda Ismail discusses the role of kinship and family links for the cases of Jamaah Islamiyah in his paper titled "Al Qaeda's Southeast Asia, Jamaah Islamiyah and Regional Terrorism: Kinship and Family Links" published by *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* (2007).

Family-turned activists are those who have a strong family background of Islamist activism but then turned toward more radical forms. A noticeable example was the story of a son of the former Chairman of the National Board of Muhammadiyah. In addition to his engagement with Muhammadiyah, this individual became an activist within the Salafi movement and even went to join Laskar Jihad and fight in Ambon. Feeling disappointed with the "moderate" nature of Muhammadiyah, he found the more radical and puritanical Salafi movement a more fitting and fulfilling outlet for his religious passion. In the aftermath of his close engagement with the Salafi, he decided to quit the political arena, including his position as a leading figure of the Islamist party PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) in Yogyakarta province. Another salient example of family-turned activist is an ex-student of the technical faculty at Gadjah Mada University who left his studies to participate in jihad in Ambon. Originally from a middle class Muhammadiyah family, he eventually turned into an activist within the Salafi movement, where he feels he is finding a more "proper Islam."

Family-shifted activists are those who have become radical Islamist activists by shifting from their non-activist family links. Among them were Hasanuddin, the ex-leader of JI in Poso who is now in jail for his role in several terror attacks in Poso. Another is a senior leader of FPI (the Islamic Defender Front) in Pekalongan. Both come from abangan

(non-devout Muslim) families but actively engaged in Islamist movements and became leaders. Hasanuddin was shaped by his school period when a wealthy Islamist activist in Wonogiri fostered him—though he then thought that his foster parent was “too moderate.” The FPI leader took his own personal journey to Jakarta in search of a job, where he found an Islamic charity foundation that gave him a place to stay and instruction in Islam.

Based on these stories, we could say that the conditions leading to radicalization and violence can vary from family ties, to quests for personal adventure, to a social environment that is particularly conducive to Islamism.

Sidney Jones—October 15, 2008

What experiences, circumstances, or sense of moral outrage contributes most to the radicalization process?

Among DI/JI members, there were usually several clusters of factors.

One cluster was the social network: young men joined radical groups because their friends did, because they were exposed to radical preachers in small religious study groups, because they were indoctrinated in schools, or because their families encouraged them (especially for children of DI members).

A second cluster was the political environment: fear of Communism after the Vietnamese victory in 1975 for the original DI men, Tanjung Priok and Soeharto’s Pancasila-only policies in the mid-1980s for DI members, Ambon and Poso for those who came of age in the late 1990s, and aggressive Christian proselytization and conversion of Muslims for the Palembang group in 2006-8.

A third was the availability of the radical narrative or framework: this is where the history of the DI struggle in West Java was critical or where jihadi publications, websites, and VCDs come in for the current JI members. While the contemporary narrative includes the long list of grievances against the West, that generic anger generally is not the most important factor.

What triggers people to turn violent in defense of Islam?

One important factor is simply the availability of opportunity. Many of the DI/JI members who got involved in bombing operations would not have considered it unless they were directly offered a chance to participate through the existence of local jihads, credible ustads’ powers of persuasion, and some kind of logistic support. There is a difference between the suicide bombers—where recruiters deliberately played into a sense of heroic idealism but were also looking for loners—acts of armed robbery (fa’i) or assassinations—which could be a way to test the mettle of young recruits or to prove their worth to the organization—and involvement in larger jihad operations against a collective

enemy—such as in Ambon, Poso, and Mindanao—where there is positive reinforcement from a much larger group.

How do terrorist networks form and how do they mobilize people for violence?

In the Indonesia cases, the role of individuals and the availability of resources have played a huge role. Hambali, Zulkarnaen, and Mukhlas would not have been able to spin off their operations unit from the JI structure had they not had access to independent funding from al Qaeda. Noordin might not have formed his breakaway group had he not suddenly realized there were extra explosives available. These groups need a leader, resources, and an idea for an operation. They mobilize people through deliberate cultivation in small discussion groups, where someone with more mastery of Islam than the others can rationalize the plans in jihadi terms.

TIN Question 7: Policy Recommendations and Guidance for Improved Government/Nongovernmental Cooperation

What policy recommendations (new policies or changes to current policy) might you offer the governments of Southeast Asia, Australia, and the United States in their struggle to understand, prevent, and respond to discrete groups of concern or threats in specific geographic areas within the region? These recommendations will be included in the final report.

This exercise was intended, in part, to demonstrate that the capabilities of nongovernmental experts using open source information can exceed the expertise or access of government analysts. What else can be done to bridge the knowledge gaps between those working in the field (you) and those in government? What kind of interaction should be avoided?

Sidney Jones—October 18, 2008

Preventing radicalization:

- address justice and accountability issues in Thailand and the Philippines;
- avoid human rights abuses by law enforcement and prison personnel;
- avoid discriminatory “profiling” in the course of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns;
- improve the management of communal tensions in Indonesia and Malaysia;
- find workable mechanisms for addressing land disputes between Muslims and Christians in vulnerable areas such as Indonesia and Mindanao;
- ensure the availability of youth activities and alternative career options, perhaps with the help of the Muslim private sector, for children in vulnerable areas (in Indonesia, these areas would include the immediate neighborhood of JI schools); and

- ensure the inclusion of prison personnel in counterterrorism programs and, likewise, ensure that others involved in counterterrorism programs understand the importance of prison reform.

“Deradicalization”:

- Understand that “deradicalization” is as often a question of economic co-optation or keeping individuals away from opportunities for violence as it is any real ideological transformation;
- Prisoners in “deradicalization” programs should be the subject of longitudinal studies, to see where they—and their children or younger siblings—are in two, five, and 10 years.

Research needed:

- The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) should undertake an assessment of the impact of American-funded counterterrorism programs in Southeast Asia. This assessment should examine all the money poured into interfaith dialogues, support for “moderate Muslims,” conferences and seminars, law enforcement training, and education. This should include a careful evaluation of what has worked, what has not, what criteria were used to determine “success,” and what lessons can be learned;
- Research is needed on the degree to which aggressive Christian evangelical proselytizing generates radical Islamic backlash and the extent to which the evangelical organizations and preachers concerned receive funding from public or private sources in the United States.

Muhammad Haniff Hassan—October 24, 2008⁹

1. More study is needed to understand the radicalization process. The objective of such a study may not necessarily be to develop an overarching theory. A clear understanding of how radicalization occurs within a certain context—e.g. within Indonesia or Pattani—would be very helpful for counter-radicalization in that context.

2. Related to the above point, a more differentiated and segmented approach is needed to understand radicalization. One main objective should be to develop a clear understanding of the high-risk-group for radicalization. This will enable practitioners responsible for counter-ideology or counter-radicalization to focus their efforts on the most vulnerable segment in the society and tailor programs according to their needs.

⁹ The content from this post is adapted from Muhammad Haniff Hassan, “Counter-ideological Work: Singapore Experience,” in *The Ideological War on Terror: Worldwide Strategies for Counter-terrorism*, ed. Anne Aldis and Graeme P. Herd (New York: Routledge, 2007), 143–159.

3. Until now, only the British government has put up a very clear policy paper on how to conduct counter-extremism at the national level.¹⁰ Such clarity would provide a tremendous boost to the effort. Thus, we should encourage many other governments to take similar steps and adopt lessons from the British strategy paper, with some adjustments.

4. A global network of counter-extremism/radicalisation/ideology experts and practitioners should be developed to facilitate the sharing of knowledge and experience. Related to this, an online clearinghouse for counter-ideology material would be a great help. If the jihadists had al-Maqdisi's Website, the largest repository for jihadist materials, a similar counter-site would be useful for anybody who wishes to learn about alternative views to the extremism. Practitioners could also use this resource so they do not need to reinvent the wheel.

5. More creative media for counter-ideology purposes should be created in the form of short videos, flash, wallpaper, and games. These modes of communication should reinforce texts containing intellectual work or entice people to read such text. In addition, this media could subtly socialize the message by making it "cool" among youth.

Anthony Bubalo—October 30, 2008

First, looking back over the last few years, you have to say that ultimately Southeast Asia has proven a poor theatre of operations for al Qaeda and international jihadism. JI in Indonesia has become, by and large, more domestically focused. Other regional conflicts involving Muslim communities have, by and large, rejected the al Qaeda narrative. Southeast Asia underlines what is also becoming apparent in the Middle East: all politics is local and ultimately al Qaeda as a movement and a narrative has its limits.

Second, and closely related to this first point, this eventuality is all the more remarkable given the rhetoric some governments have used—including my own—to describe this particular threat after 9/11. That is, by overdrawing the links that certainly did exist between a group like JI and al Qaeda, these governments were, in effect, aiding and abetting al Qaeda's own effort to portray every Muslim conflict in the world as part of some wider, global civilizational struggle. This even extends to well-intentioned but poorly thought-out initiatives like inter-faith dialogues. These initiatives imply that the solutions to militancy and violence can be found in relations between the Muslim world and the West, rather than the dynamics of local politics.

Does this mean that the West has no role or responsibility in Southeast Asia? No, but that role should certainly be limited to things that we would already be doing in the development field, capacity building, or police and intelligence cooperation. What it also

¹⁰ See: <http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/prevent-strategy/>.

means, however, is that politicians outside the region—and some inside it—need to learn to hold their tongues.

In terms of the second question, the principle of open source is of course a sound one. It allows those inside government to tap into often well developed expertise while, at the same time, allowing outside experts to, at least indirectly, have some impact on policy. In an Australian context at least, and I imagine elsewhere, it is certainly something we will see more of given the focus of even some intelligence agencies on the urgencies of the moment.

That said, there are some pitfalls. This kind of engagement is sometimes a fine line for a researcher who is often dependent on developing relationships of trust with the subjects of that research. I would also say that it is not always the case that information flows are a two-way process. This flow is ultimately critical to make exercises like this an enduring and rewarding process for both sides. I understand the difficulties of doing that, having worked on “the other side” in the past. Because I have, I can also say that there is at times an undue cautiousness in government circles about sharing information that needs to be broken down a bit.

6

INSIGHTS FROM TIN-2 FREE DISCUSSION POSTS

This section consists of selected TIN posts that did not address the moderator’s specific discussion questions. This content speaks to the ability of TIN members to raise important issues and questions not considered by the moderator and illustrates how TINs can help the convener “identify what they do not know.” Unlike the first TIN, TIN-2 had a “free discussion space” wherein TIN members were free to post at will. This space encouraged debates of interest to TIN members and generated some of the most valuable content of the project. In future collaborative endeavors, it will be vital to provide a similar outlet where subject matter experts can drive exchanges in a self-organized manner in tandem with more structured forms of interaction.

The Moro and Pattani Insurgencies: A Comparison

Joseph Liow—June 4, 2008

I would like to jump in here on the similarities and differences between the Moro and Pattani struggles, since it is something I have written on. I would also like to share a bit about the nature of the insurgency in southern Thailand based on some recent interviews I have done. There is much that is similar between the two conflicts. Both are ethno-religious struggles and exhibit some of the same evolving tactics. There are also some rather glaring and substantial differences. The decentralized nature of resistance is something that is clearly evident in southern Thailand. While the MILF is more centralized, there are also fissures within the movement, with renegade local commanders not exactly toeing the line from the top leadership. But the fact of the matter is that the violence and conflict in southern Thailand is more organic in nature, and a close look at the nature of attacks indicates that there are different actors and agendas involved.

This nature is also evident in what little propaganda has surfaced from the militants. These messages range from conciliatory pleas for support from the local population to outright threats of retaliation. Nor has there been any attempt at a systematic articulation of a blueprint for a Pattani state—religious or otherwise—in southern Thailand. This, of course, contrasts with the efforts of the MILF, which has labored to present a coherent vision of a Bangsamoro state. (Whether or not it is viable is another matter altogether.)

Similarly, in Thailand there are no signs of any move toward negotiations - even though there are a few dialogue channels now in place. Even so, these dialogue channels are as convoluted on the Bangkok side as they are on the militants' end. It is unclear if the exiled militant leaders who are fronting these dialogue attempts and trying to bridge the new generation are effective in their efforts. It also remains to be seen if they are being listened to by the new generation. On the Bangkok side, the NIA, NSC, and the Army all claim to have their own channels of dialogue. This comes as no surprise since each entity is operating independently of the others. It is a really difficult situation, and my sense is that it will get worse simply because of the mess taking place in Bangkok today.

On the matter of dialogue, I recently had a chance to meet with a local leader of some cells in Pattani. His case is interesting. He was a foot soldier during the 1980s when PULO was arguably at its peak. However, when PULO came apart as a result of the Thai counterinsurgency campaign, people like him felt abandoned and disillusioned when the leadership capitulated. These "middle management" men are now back in the picture. They have been approached by groups of young militants to provide leadership for the movement. Clearly there is a massive gulf between their ideas of insurgency and that of the youth. For instance, the leader I interviewed described how shocked and impressed he was by how efficiently some of the youths in the cells under his command planned and carried out attacks. People like him appear to be the bridge between the old and new generations.

Money Laundering in Thailand

Bertil Lintner—September 30, 2008

The process of laundering money in Thailand usually consists of three phases:

Placement, the first phase, is the physical disposal of the bulk of cash profits, usually lots of small bills that are proceeds from criminal activity such as drug sales, prostitution rackets, and extortion. Few bankers would be amused if a customer walked in lugging a suitcase full of assorted bank notes. There are two ways around this. One is called "smurfing," or going in and out of several banks, each time depositing or remitting smaller, less suspicious amounts of cash. The other is to set up a cash-intensive business where it is legitimate to end up with lots of assorted bank notes, such as a bar, a hotel, or a gas station. In Bangkok, for instance, there is a string of "theme bars" run by a Hong Kong crime syndicate. These establishments have fancy décor, lots of girls, and very few customers. The lack of customers does not matter. Criminals in Hong Kong deposit their cash with an underground banker in the territory. The criminals' counterparts in Bangkok then collect it at a local gold shop, or wherever the Hong Kong-based underground banker's partner is in Bangkok. The money is then taken to the bars—and the next day the bar owner can walk into the nearest bank and say "gosh, we had a great night at the bar last night, we sold lots of beer, etc." In northern Thailand, some gas

stations serve the same purpose. Motorbikes fill up for 20-50 baht and cars a few hundred, so the gas station owner ends up with lots of petty cash. He can then add whatever revenue he generated from drugs sales, and deposit all of it in a local bank.

The next step is called layering, and entails the piling of layers of complex financial transactions such as wire transfers to separate the proceeds from their illicit sources. This is usually done only if the depositor wants to transfer his money to a bank outside Thailand.

Integration is the third step and involves the provision of legitimate-looking explanations for the appearance of wealth by making investments in the open economy, such as hotels, restaurants, supermarkets, night clubs, and real estate investments. Laundered money can also be used to finance luxurious homes or just extravagant lifestyles, as long as steps one and two have been taken.

The Internet has made layering, in particular, much easier. Money can now be transferred around the globe simply by touching the keyboard on a computer. The speed of the Internet, combined with encryption technologies, has made it next to impossible to trace the actual origin of deposits.

I doubt that the insurgents/politicians/police in southern Thailand are that sophisticated. The three-step laundering process outlined above applies to international criminal syndicates and perhaps also to international terrorist organizations. In the south, I suspect that money laundering is done in a more primitive way, through gas stations, eateries, and other cash-intensive businesses. This would explain why a certain individual has a bag full of cash that he wants to deposit in a bank.

There are also the underground banks, the Chinese system, and hawala. If, for instance, a person in Kunming wants to travel to Thailand, there are restrictions on how much cash they can take out of China. However, they can walk into a travel agency in Kunming and there deposit any sum in Chinese renminbi—and pick up the equivalent amount at a moneychanger in Chiang Mai. Likewise, if someone in Thailand wants to invest in China, or transfer drug money to China, they can visit the moneychanger in Chiang Mai, deposit the money there, and pick it up from the travel agent in Kunming. It is instantaneous, faster than bank transfers, and much less risky. The money does not actually move. Instead the two “ends” invest their respective money in other money-making enterprises, and meet once a year or so to even out the books. Hawala works the same way but is used mainly by people of South Asian and Middle Eastern origin. In Chiang Mai, the main Hawala outlet is a shop selling Oriental carpets. It is easy to fiddle the books there; carpets can be overvalued on invoices, etc. Money can then also be transferred through “normal” banking channels.

Joseph Liow—October 9, 2008

In addition to this, in southern Thailand there are a number of Islamic charities which are very active in welfare work locally but whose book-keeping practices are not exactly up to the standards we are familiar with. Some of these I am aware of are Jamiyyah al-Islah al-Khoiriyah and al-Jamiyyah al-Khoiriyah Lil-Syu'un al-Islamiyah in Pattani, and Jamiyyah Ommul Qura al-Khoiriyah in Yala. Their Arabic names betray their identity as Salafi-reformist organizations (which they indeed are). They receive funding from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, among other places. That said, funding has been reduced due to the scrutiny of the Thai government. I do not intend to imply that these foundations are fronts for criminal activity, or are sponsoring violence. The point, though, is that their accounting practices are rather laissez-faire and can easily be manipulated by various people—including recipients—for more insidious activities. In fact, I am pretty sure that such manipulation takes place.

The Status of JI in Malaysia

Sidney Jones—March 18, 2008

Regarding JI in Malaysia, there are almost certainly still individuals loyal to JI—particularly in Johor, Kelantan, and Sabah - but the structure appears to have been smashed. The Malaysians in the Philippines, with the exception of Zulkifli bin Hir a.k.a. Marwan, seem to be Darul Islam, not JI, from a faction that goes back to the original DI members who fled Sulawesi in the mid-1960s and settled in Tawao, Sandakan, and Kota Kinabalu. The KMM, defined by Mahathir in 2001 as Kumpulan Militan Malaysia and by themselves as Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia, was a real organization and JI-affiliate, not just a creation of Mahathir to arrest his PAS opponents, although there may have been a few people picked up in the mix who were not linked to KMM. But there's very little of it left, and there was never any indication that the PAS leadership supported the younger PAS members who were involved, despite family ties. In any case, JI is not the real danger in Southeast Asia now. Rather, it is the splinter groups that can build on the same ideology. The Southeast Asians in Mindanao are a case in point. Dulmatin is not that important. It is the Indonesian named Umar Patek who is leading what may be the most dangerous group in the region. This group includes Indonesians from KOMPAK, not JI; Malaysians from DI, not JI (with one or two exceptions); a Singaporean who was probably JI; and a weird mixture of mostly Abu Sayyaf, but with elements of Raja Solaiman Movement, MNLF, and MILF mixed in.

Additional Thoughts on Radicalization

Sally Neighbour—March 10, 2008

Colleagues, I recently completed a 45-minute report for my program, ABC TV's "Four Corners," on the impact of counterterrorism policing on Australia's Muslim communities, particularly young Muslim men. The program, which went to air last night, can be viewed at www.abc.net.au/4corners along with extended interviews, some of the research material, and the transcript of a lively online forum that we conducted after the program.

The program examined the sense of alienation experienced by many young Muslims as a result of the "war on terror," community attitudes since 9/11, and the Bali bombings. Young Muslims typically report feeling that they are demonized by politicians, typecast by the media, abused and hated by the wider community, and discriminated against by police, employers, teachers, and others. Despite Australian police and intelligence agencies insisting they do not use profiling, there is strong anecdotal evidence of Muslims being targeted by heavy-handed counterterrorism policing and use of the anti-terrorism laws—of which no less than 35 have been passed since 9/11 and Bali!

I was personally disturbed by the extent of marginalization and alienation felt by young Muslim males and the resulting feelings of anger, hurt, bitterness, and resentment. The program went on to examine the nexus between alienation and radicalization, which has now been demonstrated by a great deal of international research including that done by Marc Sageman, the New York City Police Department, and Professor David Wright-Neville from the Global Terrorism Research Centre at Monash University, whom we interviewed for the program.

Some of the issues are canvassed in an excellent report produced by GTREC in conjunction with the Victoria Police, entitled "Counter-Terrorism Policing and Culturally Diverse Communities," which you can find online at: <http://arts.monash.edu.au/politics/terror-research/>.

Kumar Ramakrishna—March 17, 2008

This posting by Sally is significant. In my own research into the issue of counterterrorism policing, especially from a historical perspective, there is much evidence that relatively heavy-handed measures against a community from which militants emerge, with little attention paid to discriminating between friend and foe, tends to create enemies where none existed before. In the first four years of the Emergency in Malaya, the Police, led by Europeans but with a largely Malay rank and file, were guilty of heavy-handed measures against the rural Chinese community from which the Communist Party of Malaya guerrillas drew their support. The tough Emergency regulations, including individual and collective detention and deportation to China, as well as collective punishment of entire villages deemed to be un-cooperative in providing information on guerrilla movements,

were applied by and large against the rural Chinese segment of the population. This included timber workers, rubber tappers, coal miners, tin miners, and squatters; all people who lived on the jungle fringe and were thus most accessible to CPM guerrillas in search of money, information, food, medicine, and recruits. The situation got so bad by 1952 that a government study found that in 1948 and 1949, the greatest motivating factor driving young Chinese men into arms of the Communists was not Maoist ideology but rather fear of the police. This is why a Communist sympathizer sent a letter to a leading Malayan Chinese politician at the time sneering that the government's methods were equivalent to a great recruiting drive for the CPM.

This is why after 1952, the new High Commissioner, Lieutenant General Gerald Templer—a wartime protégé of General Bernard Montgomery of Alamein fame—ordered all government officials in contact with the rural Chinese community, including district officers, police, and army personnel, to be “propaganda-minded”—i.e. to be aware of the potential political implications of the application of laws and pressure from security forces. A greater effort was made to discriminate between the innocent and the guilty, based on better intelligence. A major public relations campaign was also conducted. Called Operation Service, the campaign initially required the police and later all government departments to make greater efforts to project a message that the government was a “friend of the people.” In short, winning hearts and minds was no longer just the job of Information Services, but of all representatives of government in contact with the population. After several years, this was eventually able to wean support away from the Communists to the point that they found that they could no longer carry on their campaign due to the loss of a critical mass of support.

While we do not want to compare apples and oranges (as Malaya in the 1950s is not Australia or Southeast Asia today), perhaps there are basic and irreducible lessons we can learn from history? George Santayana would probably encourage this.

Waleed Aly—March 25, 2008

Obviously I have thought a fair bit about the alienation as a driver of radicalization, especially for young Muslims in a minority—particularly Western—context.

The thought that keeps returning to me is that, more than anything, the key word is authenticity. I am not aware of any research to demonstrate this, but my experiential hunches very strongly suggest to me that radical identities among young Muslims very often meet a desire to feel authentically Muslim. Hence, as Olivier Roy observes, this is a brand of religiosity that is artificially de-coupled from culture—that is, it strives to be pure, uncorrupted, and authentic. In a minority environment, this often lends itself to take an oppositional form. That is, to be Muslim is not to be Western, but rather to be its opposite. Hence the phenomenon of what I have elsewhere called “negative Islam”: the reasoning that various things are Islamically prohibited for no reason other than that non-Muslims do them.

In that environment, authenticity subsists in opposition to mainstream culture. It follows that it is impossible to be both authentically Muslim and authentically Australian simultaneously. So those forms of religious expression that are more hard-line, antagonistic, insular, and, at an extreme, militant, become more authentic.

This might appeal to those—especially if they have only a short history of religiosity as many terrorists do—who are seeking to reassert their “Islamicity” because these people are most often trying to demonstrate their religious credentials to themselves.

Alienation, I think, needs to be understood in that context. Where one has adopted an oppositional form of religious authenticity, then one is open to social cues that demonstrate to them the irreconcilability of the Australian and Islamic identities. Thus, authoritarian police practice, hostile rhetoric as part of the culture wars, and the publication of offensive cartoons, all becomes internalized as evidence of this irreconcilability.

The trick, then, would be to foster a theology, and a social narrative, that takes every opportunity to affirm the compatibility of diverse national, cultural, and religious affiliations. In the Islamic context, the affirmation of the classical understanding of culture as religiously positive—even religiously binding on occasion—will be crucial. Socially and politically, this would demand a cultural discourse from politicians that seeks to reconcile identities, rather than require Muslims to choose their national identity above all else.

7

TIN-2 ANALYSIS

The following is an assessment of CSIS's Trusted Information Network-2 (TIN-2). This assessment focuses on the collaborative dynamics and generation of content of interest to researchers, analysts, and policymakers and speculates on how information technologies can continue to improve the value of TINs.

TIN-2 diverged from the previous TIN in important technical ways. First, the entire system was Web accessible and allowed users to participate in the online collaborative workspace from any computer. This addressed several of the difficulties that arose from the prior TIN's dependence on providing laptops to participants and working within a Groove workspace that users found difficult to use. This technological foundation allowed the group to communicate via an internal messaging system, utilize a bulletin board posting system, search an online file library, share Web links, maintain a personal blog, and submit personal profiles outlining their professional experience, expertise, and activities.

TIN-2's technology was used to facilitate the exchange of information and ideas on extremism and transnational crime in Southeast Asia. TIN-2's members were active researchers in the region and had diverse expertise on different countries or groups. This was a departure from the earlier TIN, where the researchers were globally dispersed and predominantly in possession of similar expertise. By emphasizing diversity and local information and research, TIN-2 created a unique outreach opportunity for members to engage in cross-community comparative research and collaboration, and for members and observers in the United States to gain rapid access to individuals who were directly observing and participating in local politics in areas of interest to the policy community.

This section was written and prepared by Aaron Frank and David Cedel, both of BAE Systems. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in this section are those of the authors and do not represent the view of their organization.

Observations of Collaborative Dynamics and Production

The objective of TIN-2 was to encourage a diverse group of experts to engage in the collaborative analysis of transnational threats in Southeast Asia. This provided deep coverage across the region with respect to areas or groups for which members had expertise. However, the composition of the group members with respect to their expertise, particularly their specializations, created a different interactive dynamic than in the previous TIN. Interactions among members were highly dependent on the moderator. This was evident based on the networks of interactions between discussion posts in TIN-2 and an analysis of the TIN-2 electronic messaging system. For example, in response to “Question 1: Which Groups or Actors in Southeast Asia Concern You and Why?” there were a total of 11 responses by TIN-2 participants. However, only one response was a second-order response that was a reaction to a posting by another TIN-2 participant. In fact, when compared with the previous TIN, TIN-2 maintained a total of 38 percent postings (47 out of 123) being second or higher-order postings, constituting responses to participants other than the moderator.

Figure 1: TIN-2 Discussion Postings




Figure 1 is a diagram of the TIN-2 discussion network. Red circles constitute responses to postings by other TIN-2 members, denoted as blue squares. Note that the largest blue squares are the TIN-2 moderators and that the majority of links in the graph run from members to the moderators. The larger circles denote members with higher numbers of posts.

Figure 3: TIN-2 E-Mail Network Characters Sent




Figure 3 provides another perspective on the electronic messages by examining the quantity of message content (i.e., the amount of information passed via the messaging system) as opposed to the number of messages sent. This measure, while crude, counted the number of characters sent among participants. As in Figure 2, blue squares denote message recipients and red circles denote message senders. Square sizes represent the number of characters received, and circle sizes represent the number of characters sent. As before, the majority of communication in the TIN-2 system was passed from participants to moderators, with sparse cross-communication among participants.

Another examination of the TIN-2 focuses on the association of words in the postings and messages in order to find patterns and themes in the information within the system. This approach has proven useful for dealing with large datasets, using the content of the data in the system to self-organize the system allowing for themes, associations, and patterns to emerge from free, unstructured text.¹ Examinations of the self-organized TIN-2 messages and e-mail reveal that

¹ Many systems have profited from using structured templates for processing text, such as tables and numerical scales. However, these techniques have proven difficult for experts of the type found among TIN-2's membership to employ due to their highly restrictive nature. By comparison, significant research exists regarding the processing of unstructured information, such as books, e-mail, journal articles, and

each had a distinct structure with respect to content, but both remained dependent on the activities of the moderators.

A map of the discussion board's postings showed a distinctly different set of terms and themes than a corresponding map of the e-mail system. In particular, the postings showed a considerable amount of text focused on the Philippines and Mindanao, while Burma and Cambodia featured more prominently in the e-mail system.

Figure 4: Landscape of Word Associations in E-mail Network




Figure 4 depicts a landscape generated by the associations of words in the TIN-2 e-mail system (TIN-2 discussion postings not shown). In this landscape, higher points indicate that a work appeared more often in e-mails. Likewise, the distance between points indicated the correlations among words appearing in an e-mail together. Thus, the labeling on each peak denotes a

other materials that are deeply contextual. Although technologies in this arena continue to improve, they nevertheless remain modest with respect to their ability to detect, process, and interpret unstructured text.

combination of words that occurred with high frequency in the e-mail system—providing an indication of the content and themes of messages occurring within the TIN-2 system. Importantly, many of the peaks are associated with the management of the TIN system, thanking moderators and participants, or arrangements for the final meeting in Singapore.

Another way of viewing the e-mail system is temporally, moving through each cluster of associated words. As with other perspectives on the TIN-2 system, a temporal examination of the e-mail system reveals the continued importance of moderators in the system.

Figure 5: “Betil, Border, Abuza” Cluster in Time




Figure 6: “Question, TIN, Thanks” Cluster in Time




Figure 7: Examination of March Messages in the TIN-2 E-mail Landscape



Figures 5 and 6 each selected a particular cluster in the TIN-2 e-mail landscape and then highlighted the corresponding month in which the associated e-mails were sent. In Figure 5, e-mails show a pattern of initial intensity followed by a low rate of activity in later months, indicative of long lags in asynchronous communication or a topic of enduring low-level interest

for TIN-2 members or moderators. By comparison, the cluster examined in Figure 6 regarding the management and moderation of TIN-2 has a vastly different temporal profile. In this case, e-mail messages on this subject were persistent, occurring regularly over several months.

Finally, Figure 7 inverts the analysis by selecting a given month and identifying which clusters of topics were active over that time period. In the case examined over the month of March, messages were sent that were relevant in most of the clusters circled on the landscape.

TIN-2 Collaborative Assessment

The preceding analysis is consistent with the observations of TIN-2's moderators. Despite important differences between the original TIN and TIN-2, the system remains heavily dependent on the activities and facilitation of its moderators. The discussion networks, e-mail networks, and e-mail content all suggest that the TIN-2 moderators were the central engine of discourse in the system and that their participation and oversight were essential to encouraging the exchange of ideas and information.

The collaborative dynamics also suggest an increasingly nuanced view regarding harnessing nongovernmental experts for the production of open source intelligence on strategic issues. Whereas many of the collaborative technologies being proposed throughout the defense and intelligence communities emphasize large data collection efforts and automated processing as a means for summarizing information and identifying perspectives on pressing intelligence questions in support of analysts, the statistical analysis of TIN-2's content provides an alternative experience. To be sure, automated data collection and processing tools have an important role to play, but the conversations among TIN-2 experts required expert elicitation and resulted in substantively rich, contextually nuanced, and quantitatively sparse data. Therefore, automated tools for processing data were capable of detecting primary themes and subjects discussed by TIN-2 participants but were unable to capture and present the nuanced insights presented by the experts.

Given the demands for full-time moderation and the ability of a discourse among experts to exceed the level of nuance and context preservation of text processing tools, TIN-2 provides a counterexample to much of the conventional wisdom regarding analytic and collaborative technologies. Although TIN-2 has not obviated other approaches, it does suggest that communities of analysts within government, experts outside of government, nongovernmental and international organizations, and others may each present different collaborative challenges to the IC.

Another indicator of the collaborative dynamics and requirements of TIN-2 was suggested by TIN-2's moderators. They noted that the participants felt best able to communicate in a synchronous, personal fashion and looked forward to the opportunity to meet in person despite the availability of specialized communications technology. This sentiment was supported by the structure of the TIN-2 content, indicating that the vast majority of information was passed from participants to moderators, with a lesser degree of participant-to-participant communication.

This suggests that most of the participants were saving their ideas and thoughts for a time in which they could express themselves verbally, rather than in writing. Thus, additional technologies such as video conferencing may facilitate increased collaboration, but given the geographic dispersion of the participants, it would nevertheless present a challenge for individual schedules, whereas a conference that brings all participants together provides the greatest opportunity for synchronous discussions as well as spontaneous side discussions and breakouts.

A final observation has to do with the substance of the material itself. It was noted that summaries of each individual research question were poorly received by the participants despite the summaries being a synopsis of their own writing. It was also noted that an e-mail or discussion posting by a single participant, when aggregated into a single document, created an authoritative context that extended beyond the expertise of the individual and read as if the group had arrived at a consensus on the matter. Moreover, it was noted that the group's postings did not add up to the production of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). Although the production of an NIE-like assessment was not a stated goal of TIN-2, it does provide a useful benchmark for employing nongovernmental expertise to provide policymakers with a strategic assessment of a given region or problem. To this end, it is possible that the collaborative drafting of a single document, in which participants can contribute, correct, or debate sections in which they feel confident in their expertise or wish to challenge conventional wisdom, may be more likely to emerge from a wiki-style collaboration. While this is a speculative point, it may provide a useful consideration for future TINs.

8

MOVING FORWARD: OUTREACH OBSTACLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The TIN project represents an opportunity for the IC to expand its outreach to nongovernmental experts. By highlighting our own experience engaging specialists on a critical national security issue such as terrorism, we intend to promote government action toward the same. Doing so could greatly enhance the IC's access to unique and largely untapped insights and open sources. For the U.S. government to move forward, it will have to address a number of challenges raised during our discussions with current and former U.S. intelligence officials, members of both TINs, and the project's senior advisory group. Some of those challenges are reviewed below and are followed by the authors' recommendations on how the IC might improve its outreach efforts.

Challenges to Sustained Outreach

As distinct communities with unique qualities, both IC and nongovernmental circles would bring their respective complications to a collaborative network. Legal, procedural, and cultural obstacles as well as counterintelligence/deception fears could prevent meaningful IC participation in a TIN, while concerns for personal safety, transparency, reciprocity, and professional norms could limit the engagement of nongovernmental experts.

Obstacles to Government Outreach

- Legal, procedural, and professional issues—the IC operates under highly restrictive rules regarding the release of sensitive information. These rules largely prohibit any discussion of government intelligence priorities and needs with uncleared American and foreign experts. The IC is also restricted from “tasking” U.S. citizens with intelligence-related activity except under very careful and transparent circumstances. And because the IC requires employees to report substantive contact with foreigners, such interaction is often limited. Finally, analysts are keen to avoid contact with outside experts so as not to expose their identities and jeopardize future travel abroad where they may operate under an alias.

This section was written and prepared by Aaron Frank and David Cedel, both of BAE Systems. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in this section are those of the authors and do not represent the view of their organization.

- Cultures—many aspects of the IC’s culture would still impede meaningful outreach to experts even if the aforementioned obstacles were removed. Such cultural aspects include the long-standing preference of policymakers and many intelligence professionals for secret information—believing that if it is not stolen, it is not valuable; that if it comes from a source the IC owns and controls, it is more trustworthy; and, finally, that the higher something is classified, the more accurate it is likely to be. These biases combine to draw people toward classified information and away from data and expertise seen as widely available to the public. The ODNI’s Open Source Office, meanwhile, has strongly promoted the concept of open source as the “source of first resort.” This approach and mindset must be strongly encouraged and supported where possible.
- Counterintelligence/deception—another issue with outreach is the belief that it is a potential means for outsiders to influence analysis and/or determine the IC’s knowledge gaps and requirements. These concerns are well founded. Foreign experts, however, are far more likely to collaborate on a universal threat like transnational terrorism than on polarizing bilateral issues. The IC will have to better balance counterintelligence risks with the benefits of outside expert engagement.
- Communication and academic relevance—intelligence analysts and academics meet infrequently due in part to government restrictions on revealing information and knowledge gaps to uncleared individuals. As such, fewer academics are working on issues relevant to the policy community.

Obstacles for Nongovernmental Experts

Long-standing IC obstacles are not the only barriers to government outreach. The private sector, academia, and NGOs also bring their own unique set of complications.

- Personal Safety—many nongovernmental experts are based in the field, giving them a unique perspective. This fact is precisely why their input is so important to the IC. In sensitive and violence-prone areas, however, known cooperation with governments can put individuals at risk. From our experience with the TIN project, however, many—but not all—members indicated a willingness to participate in an ongoing exchange with government analysts under certain circumstances.
- Collaboration—long-standing professional norms that discourage collaboration between academics and the IC remain strong. There are legitimate concerns about a loss of independence and objectivity for those receiving government grants or contracts with the IC. Collaboration with the military, for example, can lead to difficulty in securing faculty appointments, tenure, and publications.

- Transparency—a more significant issue that could limit nongovernment experts’ engagement in a future TIN involves transparency. Outside experts want to know what they are being engaged for and how the information they provide will be used.¹
- Reciprocity—nongovernmental experts expect a significant level of information to flow from the government. Understanding that this will not include classified information, there must be a “two-way street” for the relationship to work.

Recommendations

Since we began the TIN project in 2004, the IC has augmented its open source information collection and analysis capacity. Despite promising developments such as the ODNI’s 2008 directive on outreach (ICD 205), community-wide efforts to identify and exploit open source expertise (“outreach”)—as opposed to open source information from nonhuman sources—lag behind. In order to remedy this, CSIS recommends the following:

1. Identify the absence of outreach as a collection gap. Pursuant to obligations under Intelligence Community Directive Number 301, the National Open Source Committee (NOSC) should identify the lack of sustained and structured outreach to U.S. and foreign nongovernmental experts as a collection gap in the National Open Source Enterprise.² On identifying this gap, the NOSC should recommend a formal collection requirements system that taps resources beyond the formal intelligence community to include U.S. experts, foreign entities, NGOs, think tanks, and others. This collection requirement system should endeavor to make outside resources an integral part of the IC’s collection strategies and should focus on “best sources” rather than the ones that are deemed valuable because of the difficulty or expense by which they were obtained.
2. Identify the relative absence of outreach as an analytic weakness. The National Intelligence Analysis and Production Board (NIAPB) should recognize that the analytic outreach called for in ICD 205 has not been adequately implemented across all elements of the IC. In line with its mandate under Intelligence Community Directive Number 200, the NIAPB should lead an assessment of the community’s progress on the

¹ Further addressed in Sanderson, Gordon, and Ben-Ari, *International Collaborative Online Networks*, 3–7.

² ICD 301, which was released on July 11, 2006, calls for the National Open Source Committee (NOSC) to “Provide evaluations of the IC’s open source gaps and capabilities.” The document also requires the NOSC to “Provide recommendations to optimize future open source exploitation by elements in the IC....” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Intelligence Community Directive Number 301: National Open Source Enterprise,” July 11, 2006, http://www.dni.gov/electronic_reading_room/ICD301.pdf.

implementation of ICD 205 and provide guidance on how to better integrate outside expertise into the analytic and production process where appropriate.³

3. Strengthen and fully support outreach. ODNI made a commitment to strengthen the use of *open source information* with policy, strategies, leadership, human resources, financial support, and governance structures. These actions have benefitted the IC and would not have been possible without these concerted efforts and structural changes. Though ICD 205 is a forward step, the same level of support has not been provided for *analytic outreach*. Making effective outreach a reality will only happen with the same commitment.
4. Build support for outreach from the bottom-up. Beginning with a few senior analysts who are committed to outreach, conduct a series of collaborative projects with nongovernmental specialists. While working toward full ODNI support for outreach, this simultaneous effort could address important, unclassified topics of interest to both parties. Government analysts could develop a tangible product that offers new knowledge and insights on an issue of concern to the IC, highlighting the value of such an exercise at the working level and prompting support for expanded outreach among analysts themselves.
5. Begin at the beginning. Junior analysts should figure centrally in any “bottom-up” approach to promote outreach. Analysts now entering the IC are of the networking generation, for whom constant interaction with an array of media, information, and expertise is second nature and considered indispensable. These new analysts should be encouraged and incentivized to maintain and expand their networks. If analyst evaluation takes the strength of outside networks into account, new hires with strong external ties will not allow those associations to fray after years of isolation in the IC. Support for maintaining or building these links may include external publications, participation in academic or professional conferences, as well as funded travel. There might also be a “pairing” between new analysts and veteran analysts so that painstakingly nurtured and well-established relationships with outsiders can be institutionally maintained.⁴
6. Know the experts. Recognizing that the IC does not have 20-year veterans on some of its most important accounts, mission managers across the community should make themselves aware of the best subject matter expertise in their areas of responsibility. This

³ ICD 200, dated January 8, 2007, calls on the NIAPB to “works closely with the NIC and other ODNI elements to develop joint assessments of IC analytic capabilities... [and] guide and oversee the Community’s use of analytic resources and capabilities.” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Intelligence Community Directive Number 200: Management, Integration, and Oversight of Intelligence Community Analysis,” January 8, 2007, <http://ftp.fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd-200.pdf>.

⁴ Relationships based on trust take a long time to hand off and often require third-party introductions. As such, every effort should be made to ensure networks of trusted outsiders are not lost every time an analyst leaves their post.

work must be done within the legal limits of maintaining data on scholars and would likely begin with specialists who have already participated in IC-sponsored conferences and other activities. By definition, these individuals form a limited pool of expertise. It will be vital to constantly update, improve, and expand this roster of experts so that new members and perspectives are brought into the process. Transparency with experts will be essential.⁵

7. Outreach review. The IC should convene a group of relevant personnel to ensure that the community-wide expansion of analytic outreach is balanced with measures that mitigate associated counterintelligence risks. This group should audit efforts to access open source expertise while remaining committed to the overall goal of engagement.
8. U.S. congressional support. As it did with efforts to expand the use of open source information, Congress can and should play an important role, through its oversight and legislatively, in supporting IC efforts to strengthen outreach to experts. Congress can specifically direct resources to outreach activities and can also require the IC to report on indices of increased outreach and its impact on analysis. Similarly, Congress should be asking about the contribution of open sources, particularly outreach to outside experts, to the analysis they are being provided, making it clear that they expect to see such input reflected in any major analytic product.

We believe that many government analysts understand that outreach holds tremendous value for their work. But these analysts are hindered by many obstacles and find that expert outreach is often not worth the risks and the hassles. Barriers must be lowered and support from the ODNI must be strong and unwavering, or intelligence work will fail to meet its full potential. Expertise that can help governments with serious national security problems exists in many places and should be brought to bear as soon as is practicable. The report authors welcome your engagement and look forward to any and all comments.

⁵ This recommendation is a reinforcement of ICD 205, which states that “Analysts should have knowledge of the leading experts in their areas of expertise, both in the U.S. and internationally.” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Intelligence Community Directive Number 301: Analytic Outreach.”



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